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THE UNBORN PLAINTIFF 
David A. Gordon• 
IT is almost twenty-five years since Professor Winfield's article "The Unborn Child" was published.1 The development of this 
area of the law during the past quarter century is probably summed 
up in the distinction between that title and the one to this article. 
The defective or abnormal infant constitutes an increasingly 
pressing problem; the cost to society and in human happiness is 
beyond measurement.2 Legal attempts at a solution have been, as 
may be expected, only partial. They are reflected in the distinct 
eugenic policy that is embraced in those statutes or by those prin-
ciples of law that forbid marriage within the defined limit of 
consanguinity.8 Again, both physically and mentally diseased per-
sons are occasionally denied the capacity to marry, sometimes un-
justifiably.~ 
• Advocate, Supreme Court of South Africa.-Ed. 
1. 4 U. TOR.ONTO L.J. 278 (1942). That article was also published in 8 CAMB. L.J. 
76 (1942). 
2. It has been estimated that 250 thousand infants suffering from significant birth 
defects are born each year in the United States. MONTAGU, PRENATAL INFLUENCES 6 
(1962). 
3. See generally FoOTE & SANDER, CASES ON FAMILY LAw 2C-16 (temp. ed. 1962). 
Genetically speaking, the prohibition of marriage on the grounds of affinity are un-
justifiable, and even some consanguinous prohibitions are subject to criticism. Moore, 
A Defense of First Cousin Marriages, 10 CLEVE.-MAR. L. REv. 136 (1961). See also Hefer, 
'N Aantekening oor enkele aspekte van die verbod op huwelike tussen persons wat 
binne bespaalde grade aan mekaar verwant is, 21 TYD. HED. H-R REG. 22 (1958); Note, 
17 IowA L. REv. 87 (1931). For the Roman Law attitude, which consisted of a denial 
of the appellation "children,'' see CoDE THEOD. 3.12.1-2. 
4. See FOOTE & SANDER, op. dt. supra note 3, at 2C-59. The prohibition against the 
marriage of epileptics has been criticized on the ground that the genetic factor in 
epilepsy is insignificant. At least three states (Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) 
have repealed the statutes setting out the restrictions. 
See generally BARROW & FABING, EPILEPSY AND THE LAW (1956), WILY & STALLWORTHY, 
MENTAL ABNOR.MALITY AND THE LAw 163 (1962). Over half the states of the United 
States have eugenic sterilization laws that present a combined classification of epileptics, 
hereditary criminals, mental deficients, sex offenders, and syphilitics. 
In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the Supreme Court struck down under 
the equal protection clause the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act [OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 171 (1935)). In Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), Mr. Justice Holmes 
upheld an order directing the sterilization of a feeble-minded inmate of an institution 
in Virginia, stating: "It is better for all the world if instead of waiting to execute de-
generate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can 
prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that 
sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes 
•••• Three generations of imbeciles are enough." Id. at 207. See CURRAN, LAW AND 
MEDICINE 802-09 (1960); FOOTE & SANDER, op. dt. supra note 3, at 2C-72-80; Cook, 
Eugenics or Euthenics, 37 ILL. L. REv. 287 (1943). 
Restrictions upon persons suffering from venereal diseases are common. FooTE &: 
SANDER, supra, at 2C-80 (see also note 212 infra). Some states forbid marriage between 
persons suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis in its advanced stages. E.g., WASH. REv. 
[ 579] 
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Winfield's study was primarily comparative, and, since 1942, a 
number of legal systems have considered the question of "uterine 
personality" in tort law. Motivated by a common concern and 
backed by the tremendous increase in medical knowledge, almost 
all of the systems which have considered the problem have afforded 
at least some relief to a child for injuries sustained by it while in 
utero matris. 
The legal analyses adopted in order to reach this result differ 
widely, however. In addition, the impact of medical advances upon 
this branch of the law has been so influential that one is compelled 
to consider the present state of modern scientific knowledge in 
order to outline the present boundaries of the law. 
Doctors and lawyers have eloquently pleaded for clarification 
of the limits of therapeutic abortion; and one of the favorite 
arguments invoked in justification of the therapeutic termination 
of pregnancies is that which points to the devastating consequences 
on the fetus of German measles and irradiation.11 The choice 
between whether we ought to solve a problem by bluntly removing 
it or instead perpetuate human suffering is beyond the scope of my 
inquiry. Suffice it to say that there is a great deal of merit in the argu-
ments presented on both sides of this controversial question. But 
· one thing .is certainly clear: there is a powerfully articulate body 
of lawyers who feel that, with the present knowledge of the probabili-
ties of serious deformity or abnormality, it is unnecessary to allow 
production of such infants to materialize.6 Thus it seems strange that 
CODE § 26.04.030 (1961). Cases of congenital tuberculosis have been reported iri MON· 
TAGU, PRENATAL INFLUENCES 308-09 (~962). 
5. FooTE &: SANDER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 5B-11-29; G. L. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY 
OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAw (1957); Final Report, Los Angeles County Grand Jury 
53 (1960); Culiner, Some Medical Aspects of Abortion, IO So. AFRICAN J. FoR. MED, 9 
(1963); Leavy &: Kummer, Criminal Abortion: Human Hardship and Unyielding Laws, 
35 So. CAL. L. REv. 123 (1962); Packer &: Gambell, Therapeutic Abortion: A Problem in 
Law and Medicine, 11 STAN. L. REv. 147 (1959). 
For religious viewpoints on this and related matters, see DALY, MORALS, LAw 
AND LIFE (1961); Curran, in ROSEN, THERAPEUTIC ABORTION 153-72 (1954). 
6. In addition to authorities cited in note 5 supra, the American Law Institute has 
reported that: 
"Current American legislation does not provide for aborting probable defective 
offspring, except as such result might be reached under the half dozen statutes 
that prohibit 'unlawful' abortion without defining what is unlawful. Despite the 
uncertain legal status of eugenic as distinguished from therapeutic abortion, such 
operations are regularly performed by responsible physicians in hospitals through-
out the country •••• 
"The criminal law should speak unambiguously on the authority of the physi-
cian to act where he believes that continuance of the pregnancy entails substantial 
risk that the offspring will be a physical or mental casualty. The prospective birth 
of a seriously defective child may even constitute a threat to the mental health 
of the apprehensive mother, but it seems preferable to rest the matter directly on 
scientific prognostication of the child's state of health rather than on the more 
uncertain prediction of the mother's reaction." 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). 
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legal systems have experienced difficulty in recognizing a right to 
compensatory relief for infants who were subjected to unnecessary 
tortious infliction of harm during prenatal life. 
To Religion and Medicine, life begins at conception;7 but, to 
Law, legal personality begins only at birth.8 This jurisprudential 
concept is the origin of much of the difficulty. 
I. HISTORY 
A. The Common-Law Foundations 
The early common-law commentators dealt with abortion and 
the situation in which an assault resulted in a miscarriage in the 
same terms. Thus in Coke's Third Institute the following appears: 
"If a woman be quick with child and by a potion or otherwise 
killeth it in her womb, or if a man beat her, whereby the child 
dieth in her body and she is delivered of a dead child, this is a 
great misprision, and no murder, but if the child be born 
alive and dieth of the potion, battery, or other cause, this is 
murder; for in law it is accounted a reasonable creature, in 
rerum natura when it is born alive."9 
Blackstone was more effusive, declaring that: 
"Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature 
in every individual: and it begins in contemplation of law as 
soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb. For if a 
woman is quick with child, and by a potion or otherwise 
killeth it in her womb; or if any one beat her whereby the 
child dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead child; 
this though not murder was by the ancient law homicide or 
manslaughter .... An infant in [sic] ventre sa mere, or in 
the mother's womb, is supposed in law to be born for many 
purposes. It is capable of having a legacy, or a surrender of a 
copyhold estate made to it. It may have a guardian assigned to 
it; and it is enabled to have an estate limited to its use, and 
to take afterwards by such limitation, as if it were then actually 
born. And in this point the Civil law agrees with ours."10 
At this early and formative stage of the common law, the child 
in utero was therefore not an object of ownership, but rather was 
7. "For many years while doctors scoffed the Church maintained that an embryo 
had life from the very beginning and that to destroy it was to take life. This con-
tradicted the generally accepted opinion that life did not begin until around the 
time the mother felt the baby's movements. Scientists now believe as the Church 
has contended, that there is life from the moment of conception." 
Sontheimer, Abortion in America Today, Woman's Home Companion, Oct. 1955, p. 44, 
in FOOTE &: SANDER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 5B-21. 
8. See text at note 46 infra. 
9. 3 CoKE, THIRD INST, 50 (1797). 
10. 1 BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTAltIES Comm. 1, 129-ll0 (4th ed. 1771). 
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the subject of state protection. It was also recognized as capable of 
acquiring property rights, but this was conditioned by live birth. 
As The Earl of Bedford's case held: "[A]lthough filius in utero 
matris est pars viscerum matris . . . yet the law in many cases hath 
consideration of him in respect of the apparent expectation of his 
birth."11 
It is interesting to speculate, as the Louisiana court did in con-
struing its civil code,12 as to whether the recognition extended to 
the child in criminal and property law was exclusive. Perhaps there 
was a general recognition of a uterine personality and the illustra-
tions were made simply because they were relevant to questions 
that would immediately come to mind. But, whatever might have 
been the intention, decisions recognizing the unborn child as a 
being in law were limited to these two fields.13 
In addition, the child was regarded as having a claim to life as 
evidenced by the rule requiring the staying of the execution of a 
pregnant woman until after its birth.14 
It was upon these foundations that the American contribution 
to this branch of the law was laid. Though the path was a tortuous 
one, thorough debate and frank discussion, combined with a warm 
reception afforded to advances in science, have provided a fine 
example of the inherent creative aspect of the common law.15 
B. The Initial American View 
Despite the resulting disappointment, it was perhaps fitting 
that it fell upon Mr. Justice Holmes, while still on the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court, to first consider, in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of 
Northampton, the status of the fetus in common-law tort law.16 
The Holmes opinion bristled with dicta and an inexplicable er-
11. Michaelmas Term, 28 &: 29 Eliz., 4 Coke 7 f.7 (1586) (Wilson ed. 1777), 77 Eng. 
Rep. 421. Coke's citations, omitted here, are discussed in Winfield, supra note 1, at 280. 
12. Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. Ct. App. 1928). See also Pinchin N.O. v. 
Santam Ins. Co., [1963] 2 So. Afr. L.R. 254 (W). 
13. R. v. Senior, 1 Moody C. C. 346 (1932); Villar v. Gilbey, [1907] A.C. 139; Elliott 
v. Joicey, [1935] A.C. 209. See also Thellusson v. Woodford, 4 Vesey Jr. 227 (1798), 31 
Eng. Rep. 117 (1798), where Judge Buller's "let us see what this non-entity can do" 
speech is set out at pp. 321 and 163. 
14. 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 2.51.9 (Curwood ed. 1824); 2 HALE, PLEAS OF 
THE CROWN 412 (Dogherty ed. 1800), reports that a jury of twelve "discreet" women 
were empanelled to decide whether to delay execution. Hale goes on to say, "but I 
have rarely found but the compassion of their sex is gentle to them in their verdict, 
if there be any colour to support a sparing verdict." Id. at 413. 
15. See Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV, L. REv. 463, 
484-85 (1962): "Seldom in the law has there been such an overwhelming trend in such 
a relatively short period of time as there has been in the trend towards allowing re• 
covery for prenatal injuries to a viable infant." Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56, 62 
(N.D. Iowa 1960) (div. action applying Iowa law). 
16. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 188 Mus. 14 (1884). 
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ror.17 Perhaps a good deal of the hardship flowing from it might 
have been avoided if subsequent courts had at least limited it to 
its holding. Holmes held: 
"[I]f we should assume . . . that a man might owe a civil 
duty and incur a conditional prospective liability in tort to 
one not yet in being, and if we should assume also that causing 
an infant to be born prematurely stands on the same footing 
as wounding or poisoning, we should then be confronted by 
the question . . . whether an infant dying before it was able 
to live separated from its mother could be said to have become 
a person recognized by the law as capable of having a locus 
standi in court, or of being represented there by an administra-
tor."18 
In the light of the result, as Holmes nowhere specifically answered 
the question he posed, his answer must be assumed to have been no, 
the infant not yet viable does not have legal personality.19 Holmes' 
fiat is the extent of the authority of the case. 
C. Debate and Progress 
Subsequent courts, however, did not reopen the question for 
some sixty years; fortified by other broad considerations and 
reasoning, they denied the remedy. But this did not occur without 
difference of opinion. 
In Stemmer v. Kline, Chief Justice Brogan (dissenting) joined 
issue with the basis of the Holmes opinion. He asked why the 
courts should feel restrained from breaking with the doctrine 
that a child en ventre sa mere has no separate being in the field 
of torts when in every other field of law a child has a separate 
being, is a person, if being in that category is for its benefit.20 
17. Holmes argued that the analogy from the criminal statutes to tort law in fact 
hindered recovery on the grounds that the accused's act would be murder (homicide) 
only if the mother were "quick" with child. Holmes then noted the statutory provi-
sions for the punishment of attempts to procure miscarriages and, noting the increase 
in punishment if the woman died after the attempt, seized upon the fact that there 
was no corresponding increase if the child died even after leaving the womb. The 
New York Law Revision Commission, Communication to the Legislature Relating to 
Prenatal Injuries, Jan. 23, 1935, at 6 n.4, points out the fallacy of this argument. 
"The argument of the court based on the last mentioned statute failed to take 
into consideration the fact that the first statute amply provides for punishment for 
the death of the child, and it would be unnecessary repetition to include the 
provisions of the first statute in the second. It is submitted that the court has 
neglected to perform the simple act of reading the two statutes together and has 
thereby drawn unfounded conclusions from the language of the last statute alone." 
18. 138 Mass. at 16. Holmes went on ,to add: "(A]s the unborn child' was a part of 
the mother at the time of the injury, any damage to it which was not too remote to be 
recovered for at all was recoverable by her .••• " Id. at 17. 
19. This is discussed in detail in the text accompanying note 52 infra. 
20. Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L 455, 468, 26 A.2d 684, 687 (1942) (concurring 
opinion). 
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The argument that the right of action should be denied for 
reasons of practical convenience and public policy21 was met by a 
more persuasive policy justification in the same year. The Supreme 
Court of Canada, in a decision that exerted a considerable influ-
ence on subsequent legal development in the United States, got 
to the root of the matter in stating that, since the child must carry 
the burden of infirmity that results from the other's fault, it is 
only natural justice that it, if born alive and viable, be allowed 
to maintain an action.22 
Again, a broad justification for denial of relief was sought by 
the submission that in many cases it would be impossible to es-
tablish satisfactorily, except by speculation, the viability of the 
child and that its death or condition was proximately caused by 
the injury.23 This was answered with the observation that the right to 
bring an action is clearly distinguishable from the ability to prove 
the facts. The first cannot be denied simply because the second may 
not exist.24 
The limits of judicial creativity were then summoned by an 
Illinois court in an effort to make the injustice more palatable. 
It responded to the argument that where there is a wrong a remedy 
should be provided by saying this plea should be addressed to 
the legislature.25 But the challenge was met squarely by the Ohio 
court: "No legislative action is required to authorize recovery for 
personal injuries caused by the negligence of another. Such right 
was one existing at common law.''26 
A Texas court was probably the most candid, expressing the 
basic fear that many false claims, difficult to refute, would follow 
if such a right of action were recognized.27 The Maryland court 
retorted, however, that since the detection and elimination of faked 
claims is not new to judicial bodies, ·that argument should not 
prevent legitimate claims from being heard.28 
Those courts that denied relief also appealed to the lack of 
precedent for such a right of action, argued that the fiction of the 
21. Krantz v. Cleveland, 32 Ohio N.P. 445, 452 (1933). 
22. Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, 4 D.L.R. 337, 344 (1933). The court in Bonbrest 
v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 143 (D.D.C. 1946), tersely answered the "stability argument": 
"The law is presumed to keep pace with the sciences and medical science has made 
progress since 1884." 
23. Magnolia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 360, 78 S.W.2d 944, 
950 (1935). 
24. Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 437, 79 A.2d 550, 559 (1951). 
25. Smith v. Luckhardt, 299 Ill. App. 100, 108, 19 N.E.2d 446, 450 (1939). 
26. Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 128, 87 N.E.2d ll34, 340 
(1949). 
27. Magnolia Coca-Cola Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. ll47, ll60 (19ll5). 
28. Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 4ll7, 79 A.2d 550, 559 (1951), adding 
that medical knowledge would do away with some of that difficulty. 
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civil law as to property rights and the criminal law were not of 
general application,29 and relied on the Restatement of Torts.30 
Two courts expressed the fear that from recognition of a right of 
action would follow the capacity of the child to sue its mother, a 
question they were not asked to decide.31 
The courts that finally did grant the remedy did little more, as 
has been seen, than to controvert persuasively the opposition argu-
ments. Some invoked the ubi jus, ibi remedium maxim.82 
It can be appreciated that the argument grounded upon lack 
of authority soon itself provided enough authority to allow courts to 
rely on stare decisis, and Dietrich fathered an impressive line of 
precedent.83 After 1946, however, when a district court in Bonbrest 
v. Kotz84 relied upon the dissent in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital to 
sustain the plaintiff's action,35 a growing body of conflicting de-
cisions developed, finally culminating in a number of courts over-
ruling their previous decisions. 36 
In addition, other courts, considering the question de novo, 
have granted the child's right of action.37 Today the majority rule 
permits some recovery, although, as discussed later, it may be limited 
and conditioned. Besides the four jurisdictions that have not had the 
opportunity to reconsider their pre-Bonbrest views,38 the question 
must be regarded as still doubtful in three other states, primarily be-
cause of the broad reasoning adopted in opinions denying a right of 
action to the beneficiaries of an infant that died en ventre sa mere.39 
Most of the cases have been heard on demurrers or motions 
29. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900); cf. Tucker v. Car-
michael & Sons, Inc., 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951). 
30, RE.s'l'ATEMENT, TORTS § 869 (1934). 
31. Stanford v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926); Allaire v. St. 
Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900). 
32. Where there is a right, there is a remedy. E.g., Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 
157 A.2d 497 (1960). 
33. E.g., Turknett v. Keaton, 266 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1956) (diversity suit applying 
Texas law); Cavanaugh v. First Nat'l Stores, Inc., 329 Mass. 179, 107 N.E.2d 307 (1952); 
Bliss v. Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N.E.2d 206 (1950); Jacketti v. Pottstown Rapid 
Transit Co., 67 Montg. Co. L. Rep. 37 (Pa. County Ct. 1950). 
!14. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). 
35. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900). 
36. E.g., Tursi v. New England Windsor Co., 19 Conn. 242, 111 A.2d 14 (1955); 
Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953); Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 
258 S.W.2d 577 (1953); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Puhl v. 
Milwaukee Auto Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959). 
37. E.g., Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 
101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 537, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960); 
Seattle First Nat'! Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 2d 288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962). 
38. These are Rhode Island, Alabama, Texas, and Michigan. La Blue v. Speck.er, 
358 Mich. 558, 100 N.W .2d 445 (1960), is a clear indication that the next time the 
question is posed Michigan will join the majority. 
39. Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alaska 1962); Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 
Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951); Howell v. Rushing, 261 P.2d 217 (Okla. 1953). 
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for summary judgment,40 and after settlement of the particular 
legal controversy they have disappeared from the reports. To the 
writer's knowledge, at least one of these cases went to subsequent 
trial where the infant plaintiff lost on the issue of causation.41 Per-
haps it is valid to assume that others were not continued because 
of the same difficulty. 
A good example of the judgments handed down by the courts 
is provided by Tursi v. New England Windsor Company: 42 "Where 
a viable fetus is injured en ventre sa mere through the negligence of 
the defendants he has, when born, a cause of action against them."43 
From this it appears that two conditions are required: viability 
and birth. Present controversy surrounds these requirements. 
Apparently only one state has considered the advisability of 
legislative action. In 1917, the Missouri Children's Code Commis-
sion proposed the adoption of the following provision: 
"Recovery for prenatal injuries: 
"Any person who has sustained a prenatal injury shall be 
entitled to recover therefor as though he had been born at the 
time of sustaining such injury. This Act shall apply whether 
such person was born in or out of lawful wedlock."44 
This proposal, however, was not adopted by the Missouri legisla-
ture. 
II. MODERN CONTROVERSY: WHEN DOES PROTECTION START AND 
Is IT CONDITIONAL? 
Shortly after conception the zygote (fertilized ovum) goes 
through a period of cleavage (cell division), and finally a cluster 
of cells called the morula is formed. At about the sixth day, the 
morula divides into an inner and an outer layer of cells, and the 
40. The opinions delivered on appeal from trial judgments are discusred at note 
267 infra. 
41. Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956). In 
this case, early in the mother's pregnancy she had been injured in a motor car collision. 
The infant plaintiff was born with a deformed foot, ankle, and leg. At the trial, two 
of America's leading authorities in the field of prenatal injuries, Professor T. Inghalls 
and Professor A. L. Hertig, gave expert evidence for the respective sides. Professor 
Hertig for the defense testified that at the time of the injury the limb buds of the 
infant had not yet formed, but that in any event it was inconceivable that only the 
right leg would be affected, regard being had to the developmental arrest theory 
which, at the time when the accident took place, would have rendered both limb buds, 
if in existence, vulnerable. See text accompanying note 159 infra. The jury accepted 
the defense contentions. 
42. 19 Conn. Supp. 242, 111 A.2d 14 (1955). 
43. Id. at 248. (Emphasis added.) 
44. HousE JOURNAL 571 (1919). The New York Law Revision Commission did not 
advocate any legislative action in its report. See note 17 supra. 
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inner cells then subdivide into a tri-partite cellular structure.45 
These compartments contain the fundamental materials necessary 
for the growth and development of the different parts of the human 
body. This organism, since it possesses the potentiality to develop 
into a human being, is probably entitled by force of nature to claim 
a potential "natural personality"; but it is only a fact in nature and 
is independent of the law, since "legal personality" is the grant of 
the law.46 
In most legal systems, legal personality begins at live birth,47 
but when it is to the benefit of the infant in utero, as sometimes 
happens in property law, rights have been held to vest in it imme-
diately provided it is subsequently born alive.48 In tort law as well, 
the child dependent who was in utero at the time of its father's death 
has later been given a statutory right of action against the wrong-
doer;49 but such an action may not be maintained for its benefit 
while it is still in utero.50 The mechanics of recognition has been 
the granting of conditional legal personality by means of the fiction 
of birth to the infant yet unborn. Although American courts have 
occasionally referred to the property law fiction,51 they have not used 
45. AREY, DEVELOPMENTAL ANATOMY 69-70 (6th ed. 1954); MONTAGU, PRENATAL 
INFLUENCES 20·23 (1962). 
46. NEKAM, THE PERSONALITY CONCEPTION OF THE LEGAL ENTITY 24 (1938). Graveson 
describes "natural personality" as follows: "This natural personality is not concerned 
with legal capacities or prohibitions, so that a person may count the science of burglary 
or the art of forgery among his natural accomplishments simply because these are 
things which he can do. Again, one or more of his five senses may be deficient or over-
developed. They are part of his natural personality." GRAVESON, STATUS IN THE COMMON 
LAW Ill (1953). See generally C. K. ALLEN, LEGAL DUTIES 28-70 (1931); DIAS &: HUGHES, 
JURISPRUDENCE 283 (1957). 
It seems necessary to have the additional requirement of a potentiality to develop 
into a human being, for, if we understand all living things to be cellular and grant 
natural personality to them, then spermatozoa that are also cellular must also be living. 
If "natural personality" demands "legal personality," as the American courts have held 
(sec text at note 66 infra), then the dropping of a test tube of spermatozoa may well 
give rise to a cause of action. HART &: SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 495 (temp. ed. 1958). 
47. See authorities cited supra note 46. 
48. Tomlin v. Laws, 301 Ill. 616, 134 N.E. 24 (1922); In re Holthausen's Will, 175 
Misc. 1022, 26 N.Y.S.2d 140 (Surr. Ct. 1941); Elliott v. Jokey, [1935] A.C. 209; Villar 
v. Gilbey, [1907] A.C. 139; Del Tufo, Recovery for Prenatal Torts, 15 RUTGERS L. REv. 
61, 66 n.24 (1960); Winfield, The Unborn Child, U. TORONTO L.J. 278, 279 (1942). 
49. Phair v. Dumond, 99 Neb. 310, 156 N.W. 637 (1916); Quinlen v. Welch, 23 
N.Y.S. 963 (1893); Herndon v. St. Louis Ry., 37 Okla. 256, 128 P. 727 (1912); Nelson v. 
Galveston Ry., 78 Tex. 621, 14 S.W. 1021 (1890). 
50. The George and the Richard, L.R. 3 Adm.&: Eccl. 466, 24 L.T. 717, 20 W.R. 246 
(1871); Manns v. Carlon, [1940] Viet. L.R. 280. Cf. Delatte v. United States Fid. &: Guar. 
Co., ll6 So. 2d 169 (La. 1959); Barry, The Child en Ventre Sa Mere, 14 AuST. L.J. 351, 
356 (1941). 
51. E.g., Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921) (which refused to extend 
the property law fiction to tort); Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. &: C. 227, 228 (Dist. Ct. 
1924). See also Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235 (1958). Compare Nugent v. Brook-
lyn Heights Ry., 154 App. Div. 667, 139 N.Y.S. 367 (1913), with Steggall v. Morris, 363 
Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953). 
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it as the basis for granting tort remedy, and they have removed the 
distinction between "natural" and "legal" personality. It remains to 
be seen why this has happened. 
It will be recalled that Justice Holmes stated: 
"[I]f we should assume . . . that a man might owe a civil 
duty and incur a conditional prospective liability in tort to one 
not yet in being . . . we should then be confronted by the 
question . . . whether an infant dying before it was able to 
live separated from its mother could be said to [be] ... a person 
recognized by the law as capable of having a locus standi in 
court .... "52 
The words "conditional prospective liability" and the reference 
to the capacity to sue in court seem to be relevant to birth and 
legal personality. Apparently, Holmes was not considering the 
question of biological separability.53 In Dietrich, however, the pre-
mature infant was found to have lived for some ten to fifteen 
minutes.54 Thus, if the learned Justice denied relief on the basis 
of a lack of legal personality, he recast the definition of that con-
cept and adopted the untenable proposition that legal capacity is 
conditioned by an ability to survive. A man suffering from advanced 
cancer probably has not the ability to survive; yet, if he is injured 
before he dies, it would be absurd to deny him relief in a court 
of law merely because he has no capacity to survive.55 
A. The Major Approaches 
1. The Biological Approach 
Judge Boggs, in his influential dissent in Allaire,56 flatly refused 
to contradict Holmes and was driven to interpret Dietrich as 
holding that a duty of care could not be owed to the fetus since 
it was not an entity that could independently come within the risk 
of the harm created by the defendant or one that ought to have 
been foreseen by him.57 Judge Boggs then sought an independent 
plaintiff without considering further whether or not as a matter of 
law that plaintiff should enjoy legal personality and, if so, how it 
could be best achieved. Seizing upon the concept of viability-that 
52. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 16 (1884). (Emphasis 
added.) 
53. See CURRAN, I.Aw AND MEDICINE 117 (1960), wherein the whole dispute is summed 
up as one relating to "legal status." 
54. There is some dispute as to whether the child lived at all. Stewart, The Case of 
the Prenatal Injury, 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 527, 530 (1963), doubts whether it survived 
birth. 
55. The quantum of damages recoverable would be reduced, but this is irrelevant 
to the ability to bring suit. 
56. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 III. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900). 
57. This question is dealt with in detail in the text accompanying note 113 infra. 
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period of intrauterine development when an infant is able to live 
outside its mother's womb58-he declared separate existence to com-
mence from that point. Having found his entity, he automatically 
extended to it the beginning of legal personality. 
Therefore, from the start the common law precluded itself from 
adopting the civil law fiction of "birth for benefit." In correcting 
the scientific errors of both Holmes and Boggs, American courts 
have fused legal personality with biological existence. The Wis-
consin Supreme Court had in fact adopted Boggs' dissent, but it 
denied the right to recovery on the ground that the infant was 
not yet viable at the time it was injured, despite the fact that it 
was subsequently born alive.59 Bonbrest v. Kotz60 was limited to 
the viable infant. Other courts followed suit. 
With the increase in medical knowledge, the erroneous belief 
that "viability" constituted the origin of separate being fell increas-_ 
ingly under fire. Medicine emphasized that the crucial period of 
intrauterine development during which the fetus would be most sus-
ceptible to environmental influences was during the first trimester, 
long before viability.61 Again, increased medical knowledge as to the 
effects of irradiation, 62 the etiology of certain infectious diseases, 63 
and the importance of nutritional factors64 indicate that healthy 
fetal dev~lopment may depend upon factors existing at the time 
of, or even prior to, conception. A viability limitation, therefore, 
presents a potential of working injustice. 
The courts might have argued that, as birth and viability 
are in a sense analogous facts vis-a-vis existence. in the external 
world, there would be no need to underpin a fiction of birth by 
a true fact, since fictions in law are understood to be untrue. Thus 
viability could have been discarded as unnecessary,65 the fiction 
adopted, and protection extended to the infant from the time of 
conception. 
American courts, however, have persisted in a biological ap-
proach. 66 Finding "life" in medicine begins at conception, eight 
58. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1737 (4th ed. 1951). 
59. Lipps v. Milwaukee Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916). 
60. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). 
61. See text at note 164 infra. 
62. See text at note 233 infra. 
63. See text at note 205 infra. 
64. See text at note 148 infra. 
65. The days of Benthamite "raving" at fictions fortunately are past, and it is con-
ceded by many that they play an important and integral part in every legal system. 
See generally FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 338-50 (Anchor ed. 1963); Fuller, 
Legal Fictions (pts. 1-3), 25 ILL. L. REv. 363, 513, 865 (1930-31); Van der Merwe, 26 
TYD. Vlll HED. R-H REG. 291, 294 (1963). 
66. The height of this approach was reached in Kelley v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 
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states have accorded legal personality to the zygote. 67 There is no 
doubt but that this end result is proper and just, and it may 
be confidently asserted that in the future the courts will lift the 
bar of viability. The closer one gets to the estimated time of con-
ception, 68 the more onerous will the plaintiff's burden of proof 
become. But this should not go to the right of action. 
The only doubt that can be raised concerns the sequelae of the 
biological process of reasoning, for biology inevitably came into 
conflict with legal principles and policy foundations when the 
question of the availability of a wrongful death action on behalf 
of the beneficiaries of a stillborn infant was presented to the courts. 
Wrongful death actions are, strictly speaking, separate causes of 
action not dependent upon the rights of the decedent.60 But the 
courts have not interpreted them in this manner. Absent specific 
indications to the contrary, the action is considered to be deriva-
tive. 70 
2. The Causative Approach 
In addition to the biological approach outlined above and the 
civil-law approach, which regards the infant en ventre sa mere as 
born whenever birth would be to its advantage, 71 there ~ an approach 
125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953), where it was held: "We ought to be safe in this respect by 
saying that legal separability should begin where there is biological separability." Id. at 
543-44. See also Bennet v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 485, 147 A.2d 108, 109 (1958). 
Errors of biology have been perpetrated, however, as in Stemmer v. Kline, 128 
N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (1942), where the dissent stated: "While it is a fact that there 
is a close dependence by the unborn child on the organism of the mother, it is not 
disputed today that the mother and the child are two separate and distinct entities; 
that the unborn child has its own system of circulation of the blood separate and 
apart from the mother; that there is no communication between the two circulation 
systems." 128 N.J.L. at 466, 26 A.2d at 686. 
It is only after approximately twenty-five days that the fetal heart begins to cir-
culate blood. The interchange of blood between the child and the mother is, to say 
the least, absolutely essential. See MoNTAGU, op. cit. supra note 45, at 36, 47. 
67. Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956); 
Sana v. Brown, 35 Ill. App. 2d 425, 183 N.E.2d 187 (1962); Daley v. Meier, 33 Ill. App. 
2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961); Bennet v. Hymers, supra note 66; Smith v. Brennan, 31 
N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Kelley v. Gregory, supra note 66; Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 
Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960); Von Elbe v. Stugebaker-Packard Corp., 15 Pa. D. &: C. 2d 
629 (1958). In addition, there is a dictum in Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 
2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959), that suggests that from the time of conception Wiscon-
sin will protect the infant. 
68. The necessity for estimation lies in the fact that the female ovum is susceptible 
to implantation for only about four or five days during each twenty-eight day cycle, 
and spermatozoa may survive anywhere from two to 110 hours. GLAISTER, MEDICAL 
JURISPRUDENCE AND TOXICOLOGY 359 (11th ed. 1962). 
69. PROSSER, ToRTS § 105 (2d ed. 1955); Harris, Damages in Prenatal Injuries Cases 
12 (unpublished manuscript 1962). 
70. 2 HARPER&: JAMES, TORTS§ 24.4 (1956); Note, 110 u. PA. L. REv. 553,557 (1962). 
71. See generally 1 PLANI0L, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DRorr CIVIL § 366 (La. Law Inst. 
Transl. 1959); CIVIL CODE (JAPAN) l; B.G.B. I. This is also the approach of the common 
law relating to property rights. 
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that avoids a consideration of the legal status of the fetus and re-
quires only that a causal link between plaintiff's condition and the 
defendant's wrongful act be established.72 The dissection of the 
problem under this approach is purely causative and ignores the 
question of when the harm was caused to the child. But implicit 
in this view is a requirement that the plaintiff subsequently enjoy 
legal personality-that is, birth is the donor of the right. Not only 
is the general law of status left untouched, but there is no necessity 
to debate the validity of recognizing the child in utero through 
analogies drawn from other branches of the law. Under all three 
approaches, protection is or should be afforded from conception; 
but, if the infant dies in utero or is stillborn, the approaches lead 
to different results vis-a-vis a wrongful death action by the bene-
ficiaries of the infant. 
B. Wrongful Death Actions 
The causative approach does not recognize the fetus as a person 
until birth. Therefore, if it dies before term, no action can be 
derived through it.73 Under the civil law, "advantage" is the donor 
of the rights, and, if the fetus dies, there can be no deriva-
tive action because it could not be of any possible advantage to it to 
grant a recovery to its beneficiaries; a variation on this line of 
reasoning is the double fiction employed by some modem codes.74 
Under the biological approach, however, life is the donor of the 
rights; since once there is life there can also be death, the infant's 
action will be transmissible to its beneficiaries upon its death 
in utero. 
A number of American courts have been called upon to decide 
whether the parents of a fetus that died in utero may recover under 
wrongful death statutes. The first American case allowing such an 
action was Verkennes v. Corniea.715 In that case the mother suffered 
a ruptured uterus during labor that resulted in the death of both 
herself and her child. It was alleged that the attending doctor and 
the hospital were guilty of medical negligence in that she had not 
been furnished with the necessary care and treatment. The hospital's 
72. Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. &: C. 227 (1924); Joubert, 26 TYD. vm HED. R-H 
REG. 295-97 (1963); Note, 46 HARv. L. REv. 344 (1932); Note, 15 HARV. L. REv. 313 
(1901). There is also a suggestion of this approach in Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 
364-65, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960); see also the dissenting opinion of Judge Cannon in 
Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, [1933] 4 D.LR. 337, 367-68. 
73. It is this fact that causes Del Tufo's about face. Del Tufo, Recovery for Pre-
natal Torts, 15 RUTGERS L. REv. 61, 66 (1960). 
74. CODE CIVIL (AUSTRIA} art. 22, based upon DIGEST 50.16.129. 
75. 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W .2d 838 (1949). 
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demurrer to the father's claim was dismissed. The court relied on 
Bonbrest v. Kotz, Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, and Judge Boggs' 
dissent in Allaire, all of which, instead of supporting such a cause 
of action, in fact clearly opposed such a sweeping view.76 In the next 
case, Rainey v. Horn77 (again a malpractice suit78), the court reversed 
the trial judge's grant of a directed verdict, referring the matter back 
to the jury to allow it to consider the allegations of negligence. 
As a result of these two decisions, one might perhaps entertain 
the suspicion that the courts, upset no doubt at Smith v. Luck-
hardt, 79 were descending upon doctors. But subsequent decisions 
were not confined to malpractice suits. Courts carried the biological 
approach to the conclusion that a wrongful death action is available 
even when there has not been live birth. so Other courts, however, 
have balked at this extension and have held that the legal personality 
of the fetus is conditioned by live birth.81 
Medical knowledge made an invaluable contribution to that 
class of cases in which an injured infant stood at the bar of the 
court, since it buttressed the law's desire to compensate. But the 
question of wrongful death actions is pure policy and peculiarly 
within the lawyer's domain; thus scientific contribution in this 
situation is not helpful, and two courts have finally drawn the line 
beyond which medicine is unable to goad the law. 
76. "It is but natural justice that such an infant, if born alive, should be allowed 
to maintain an action ..•• " Boggs, J., in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 
372 (1900). "Therefore when it was subsequently born alive and viable it was clothed 
with all the rights of action which it would have had if actually in existence at the 
date of the accident." Lamont, J., in Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, [1933] 4 
DL.R. 337, 344. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946), relied heavily on the 
Montreal T.ramways decision, and the whole judgment is specifically grounded on 
"survivorship." 
77. 221 Miss. 269, 77 So. 2d 434 (1954). 
78. It was alleged that before the mother went into labor the attending physician 
negligently attempted to force the birth of the baby by forceps. It was further alleged 
that the doctor began the attempt by using his hands and upon failure braced his feet 
against the mother and tugged with all his strength for a period of between fifteen 
and forty minutes to no avail. The mother was finally taken to a hospital where she 
gave birth to a stillborn child. The defense relied upon the allegation that the baby 
had turned in a manner that made normal delivery impossible; that, because the 
umbilical cord threatened to strangle it, the doctor attempted to return the child to 
a normal position; and that, after failure, the doctor attempted the forceps delivery. 
79. 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N.E.2d 446 (1939), where the doctor negligently determined 
a pregnancy to be a malignant tumor and applied radiation therapy. See text ac-
companying note 241 infra. 
80. E.g., Worgan v. Greggo &: Ferraro, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956); Porter 
v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712 (Chatham Sup. Ct. 1955); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W .2d 
901 (Ky. 1955). 
81. E.g., Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alaska 1962); Keyes v. Construction Serv. 
Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960); Shousha v. Matthews Drivurself Serv., 210 
Tenn. 384, 358 S.W.2d 471 (1962); Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 
(1958); Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960). 
February 1965] The Unborn Plaintiff 593 
In Hogan v. MacDaniel82 it was stated that, although medical 
science had experienced a great advance, the medical profession 
cannot create a right of action at law.83 And, in Drabbels v. Skelly 
Oil Co.,8¼ the court, noting that the question of whether a child 
born alive may sue for prenatal injuries was not before it, held that, 
while medical science may accelerate the birth of a viable child 
and thereby accelerate the time it comes into juridical existence 
as a person independent of the mother, it does not provide con-
vincing authority that a child born dead ever becomes a person 
insofar as the law of torts is concerned.85 
A wide split of authority has developed, and the biologists 
have advocated a "once a person always a person" rule, embracing 
it as a matter of logic.86 We now have come to the position that, al-
though originally it was illogical not to extend the rules of property 
law to tort law, when faced with the property law requirement 
of subsequent live birth we are irresistibly led to the contradiction 
of that extension as a matter of logic! 
The primary dispute, of course, centers on the relevancy of 
birth. The biologists have their champions, and, clutching the 
epithets "arbitrary," "unjust," "illogical," and "intolerable," they 
have dismissed birth as being without significance. 87 If we want to 
talk in terms of logic-a requirement to which no system of law 
can ever wholly subscribe-we may just as well say that it is illogi-
cal for majority to begin at twenty-one years of age or that an infant 
is irrebuttably incapable of criminal intention on a Thursday but 
not on a Friday. Law requires some definitive clear-cut lines, 
particularly one which heralds the beginning of legal personality. 
It is inaccurate to characterize the law of status as arbitrary,88 if 
that word is ever to have any meaningful content. Nor is an argu-
82. 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W .2d 221 (1958). 
83. Id. at 243, 319 S.W .2d at 224. 
84. 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951). 
85. Id. at 23, 50 N.W.2d at 236. 
86. See Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959). 
87. Del Tufo, supra note 73; Stewart, supra note 54, at 535-41; Note, 110 U. PA. 
L, REv. 553, 556, 562 (1962). 
At the moment of birth-and a child ought to be considered as live born if there 
is any sign of life (i.e., heart beat, muscular movement, or respiration) after it has 
been delivered altogether outside the body of the mother whether or not the cord 
has been cut (NESBrIT, PERINATAL Loss IN MODERN Ossnmucs 13 (1957)]-the child 
receives from the law the grant of legal personality. Thus, if it were to die shortly 
afterwards from injuries received in utero, the beneficiaries could sue under the stat-
utes. See Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W .2d 577 (1953); Hall v. Murphy, 236 
S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960); New York Law Revision Comm'n, Communication 
to the Legislature Relating to Prenatal Injuries, Jan. 23, 1935. 
88. See 2 HARPER 8c JAMES, TORTS §§ 18,3., at 1031 (1956), wherein the view is ex-
pressed that "arbitrariness" will always be the precipitate when lines have to be drawn. 
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ment putting cases on both sides of the line any more convincing.89 
Birth is an occurrence of such magnitude that this kind of syl-
logistic appeal is somewhat hazardous logic. On one side of the 
line, the wrongful death action is supported by an important policy 
interest, and the question that arises is whether the so-called logic 
that takes us over to the other side may also validly invoke the same 
policy foundation. For, if not, we are asked to untidy a jurispruden-
tial cupboard for no reason whatsoever, certainly not for justice. Law 
receives its acceptance through the ends that it seeks to achieve, not 
through satisfying a logical progression after prima facie scanning. 
To attack the requirement of live birth is, practically speaking, 
to abandon an interest in the fetus and to embrace a policy that 
declares that the beneficiaries of a stillborn infant ought to re-
cover under the wrongful death statutes. This is not justifiable, 
and clearly our knowledge of science does not push us over any 
line where, in an earlier and different situation, ignorance checked 
our steps. 
The hardship of many of the decisions denying relief lay in the 
fact that they required an infant to go through life, as it was so aptly 
put, bearing the seal of another's fault.90 There is no such justifica-
tion in the wrongful death situation.91 Moreover, the infant is not 
a "breadwinner." Lord Campbell's Act92 was originally designed to 
avoid the hardship of the common law that so often resulted in a 
deceased's dependents being put out onto the street. Although it is 
true that parents have been able to recover substantially for the 
loss of a minor child, the grant of compensation to the beneficiaries 
of such a minor, and a fortiori to the parents of an infant in utero, 
is in reality compensation for sentimental loss framed as though it 
were pecuniary loss.93 The award is pure speculation and is duplicity 
89. See, e.g., Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. R.Ev. 443 
(1899). 
90. Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, [1933] 4 D.L.R. 337, 344. 
91. "We are therefore not concerned here with whether an action may be main-
tained by a child injured while en ventre sa mere and born alive, and intimate no 
opinion thereabout, but where the mother suffered a miscarriage after approximately 
five and a half months of pregnancy. The policy considerations which call for a right 
of action when a child survives do not necessarily apply in the absence of survivorship." 
West v. McCoy, 233 S.C. 369, 375 (1958). (Emphasis added.) 
A New York court also stated that: "The considerations of justice which militate 
in favor of a right of action to compensate a living child for its lack of health do not 
support a cause of action in behalf of the parents of a stillborn infant for their pos-
sible pecuniary loss." In re Logan's Estate, 4 Misc. 2d 283, 156 N.Y.S.2d 49, 51 (Surr. 
Ct. 1956). (Emphasis added.) 
92. The Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Viet. c. 93, which was the forerunner of, 
and has become the generic name for, similar statutes. 
93. PROSSER, TORTS §§ 105, 715 (2d ed. 1955). 
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of the same genus Professor Keeton so persuasively attacked in his 
article.94 
A fundamental basis of tort law is the provision of compensation 
to an innocent plaintiff for the loss that he has suffered. Tort law 
is not, as a general rule, premised upon punishing the wrongdoer. 
It is not submitted that the tortious destroyer of a child in utero 
should be able to escape completely by killing instead of merely 
maiming. But it is submitted that to compensate the parents any 
further than they are entitled by well-settled principles of law and 
to give them a windfall through the estate of the fetus is blatant 
punishment.95 The actual-pecuniary-loss basis of compensation in 
wrongful death actions has, where the award will be based on specu-
lation, given way in some states to a fixed sum of money. It has been 
suggested that the same principles be adopted in the unborn plaintiff 
class of case.96 One ought to be wary not only of overlooking the 
exceptional character of uterine personality and the basic raison 
d' ~tre of the wrongful death remedy, but also of returning to archa-
ism and to looking upon a child as a chattel. 
The windfall to the beneficiaries is granted only by an insistence 
that potential natural personality demands the recognition of legal 
personality and that both begin with existence. The civil law stands 
diametrically opposed to this view, but even in the common law 
an incongruous position is reached in that there is a tort rule 
applying to the child in utero that is different from the property 
rule. It can only be hoped that this schizophrenia will be cured by 
future courts ignoring Verkennes v. Corniea.91 
C. The California Approach 
California must be treated separately. Section 29 of its civil 
code provides that: "A child conceived, but not yet born, is to be 
94. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REv. 463 (1962). 
95. The motber has not been able to recover for injuries to tbe child. See, e.g., 
Finer v. Nichols, 158 Mo. App. 539, 138 S.W. 889 (1911); Butler v. Manhattan Ry., 
143 N.Y. 417, 38 N.E. 454 (1894). Nor has her action for a miscarriage been allowed to 
include the loss of tbe unborn child. See, e.g., Thomas v. Gates, 126 Cal. 1, 58 Pac. 315 
(1899); Webb v. Snow, 102 Utah 435, 132 P.2d 114 (1942); cf. Snow v. Allen, 227 Ala. 
615, 151 So. 468 (1933). 
But tbe motber can recover for tbe additional pain and suffering inflicted upon 
her. Ephrem v. Phillips, 99 So. 2d 257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Witrak. v. Nassau 
Electric Ry. Co., 52 App. Div. 234, 65 N.Y.S. 257 (1900); Bovee v. Donville, 53 Vt. 183 
(1880); and for her anxiety caused by fear of a miscarriage of her child's deformity. 
Prescott v. Robinson, 74 N.H. 460, 69 A. 522 (1908); Carter v. Public Serv. Coordinated 
Transp., 47 N.J. Super. 379, 136 A.2d 15 (1957). 
96. Anderson, A Model State Wrongful Death Act, l HARV. J. LEG. 28, 34-35, 42 
(1964). 
97. 229 Minn. 365 (1949); see text accompanying note 76 supra. 
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deemed an ex1stmg person, so far as may be necessary for its 
interests in the event of its subsequent birth."98 
In Scott v. McPheeters,99 it was held that the word "interests" 
is general in its application and inclusive of both personal and 
proprietary rights. In that case an eleven-year-old plaintiff alleged 
that during her delivery the defendant's negligent use of forceps and 
clamps had caused serious injuries to her brain and spine, resulting 
in permanent paralysis. The court, in overruling the order of a 
lower court which had upheld a demurrer, remarked that the 
common law of the United States was diametrically opposed to 
section 29. It could find no case either in the United States or the 
rest of the world in which similar statutes had been involved. (Actu-
ally, California law is almost indistinguishable from the civil law 
practice.) 
In Norman v. Murphy,100 the court again had an opportunity 
to consider the code provision. This time the critical question was 
the relationship of the words "in the event of its subsequent birth" 
to the meaning of "a minor person." Here a husband and wife 
brought an action to recover damages for the death of their unborn 
child, who had died as a result of an automobile accident. At the 
time of the accident, the mother was approximately four and one-
half months pregnant. The court was required to decide whether 
such a fetus was "a minor person" within the meaning of those 
words in the wrongful death action provision of the Code of Civil 
Procedure.101 The wrongful death action in California is not de-
rivative, so the court apparently felt that it could not determine 
the question by complete reliance on section 29. After quoting that 
section and referring to section 270 of the Penal Code102 and the 
definition of "a minor person" in sections 25 and 26 of the Civil 
Code, the court held: "[E]ven if the courts of this state should now 
hold that an unborn viable child is 'a person' within the meaning of 
our law, it could not be held to be a minor person."103 
98. CIV. CODE § 29. 
99. 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939), petition for rehearing denied, 93 P.2d 
562 (1939). 
100. 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 268 P .2d 178 (1954). 
IOI. C1v. CODE § 377: "When the death of a person not being a minor, or when 
the death of a minor person who leaves surviving him either a husband or wife or 
child or children or father or mother, is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of 
another, his heirs or personal representatives may maintain an action for damages 
against the person causing the death." 
102. Section 270 requires a father to support a legitimate or an illegitimate minor 
child. Children conceived, but not yet born, are specifically included within that sec-
tion. The court argued that, if unborn children were "minors," there would be diffi-
culty in understanding why this specific inclusion was written into the section. 
103. Id. at 100. 
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Unfortunately, the reasoning of the court smacks of artificial-
ity; it would have been much easier to have held that section 29 
is a condition to personality and that without live birth there can 
be no person at all, rather than to create in California three cate-
gories of persons--unborn persons, minor persons, and major per-
sons. 
III. Two OTHER LEGAL PROBLEMS 
A. Foreseeability 
The recognition in law of the unborn plaintiff has proceeded 
with little discussion as to the impact it has made upon fundamental 
principles in the law of torts. 
If we assume a case wherein a pregnant woman has been injured 
and, as a result of her pregnancy, the injuries she suffers are in-
creased, the fact of her pregnancy may be regarded as an abnormal 
susceptibility on her part.104 There is no doubt that she will be 
able to recover for any additional or special injury under the "vic-
tim talem qualem," "thin skull," or "old soldier" rule.105 The 
application of this rule is under the broad heading of "remoteness 
of damage" or "compensation"-the second step in a negligence 
action, the first step being a consideration of culpability. It proceeds 
upon a consideration of the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff. 
Here the Riskers106 and the Polemists107 part ways. The former 
embrace a philosophy that foreseeability is all;108 and, since two 
leading exponents of the risk principle on both sides of the At-, 
lantic flatly accept the victim talem qualem rule as an exception 
to that principle,109 the question may be asked whether by accept-
ing the fact of pregnancy as too remote, and therefore not foresee-
able for purposes of compensation, the fetus is also not foreseeable 
for the purposes of culpability. To the extent that Polemis is author-
ity for the narrow relational test (equivalent to Palsgraf10 in the 
United States) the opponents of the risk principle are also faced with 
the problem111 of whether in the prenatal injury cases the courts 
should allow unforeseeable plaintiffs to sue. 
Some of the American courts may have been aware of a duty 
104. HART &: HONORf, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 161 (1959). 
105. See text accompanying note 186 infra. 
106. See Honore, Book Review, 77 HAltv. L. REY. 595, 599 (1964). 
107. That is, those who embrace the principle of In re Polemis, [1921] 3 K.B. 560, 
that a negligent actor is responsible for all the direct consequences of his negligent 
act. E.g., HART 8c HONORE, op. dt. supra note 104; Note, 1961 CAMB. L.J. 30. 
108. McKerron, Foreseeability Is All, 78 S.A.L.J. 282 (1961). 
109. KttroN, LEGAL CAUSE IN nu: LAW OF TORTS 67-68 (1963); Williams, The Risk 
Principle, 77 L.Q. REY. 179, 193-97 (1961). 
110. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
111. Dias, Remoteness of Liability and Legal Policy, 1962 CAMB. L.J. 178, 179. 
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problem;112 in Drobner v. Peters,118 the court held: "No liability 
can arise ... except out of a duty disregarded and defendant owed 
no duty of care to the unborn child . . . apart from the duty 
to avoid injuring the mother."114 
Certain writers have denied that a duty problem was ever real 
to the courts and have accused them of duplicity.ms But this atti-
tude solves nothing and is question-begging. Perhaps the above-
quoted words mean no more than that no duty of care can be 
owed to a legal nonentity. This could have been the position 
in 1921, but by 1946, at least, the advance in medicine had 
exerted its influence on the law and had led to an acceptance 
of the fetus as an independent person in being: that is, both 
a person in whom legal personality could reside and an in-
dependent person to whom a duty of care could be owed. But, 
whatever the conundrums of Drobner might have been, the Texas 
court in Magnolia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. ]ordan116 met the 
issue directly in holding that, since the reasonable man's conscious 
care and solicitude are for the expectant mother and not for the 
unborn child apart from her, his obligations and liability in dam-
ages for his acts should be measured and determined from his 
viewpoint.117 
Professors Harper and James find this statement "amazing,''118 
and, in attacking the decision, they invoke the example of a negligent 
driver who has "care and solicitude" only for the solitary driver of 
a bakery truck with which he collides and the pies within. Unknown 
to the driver there are some children in the back of the truck who 
are injured in the collision; the negligent driver is held liable for 
their injuries. They go on to say that "the limitation of the Palsgraf 
case contains no requirement that the interests within the range of 
peril be known or identified in the actor's mind, or even be in 
existence at the time of the negligence."119 
112. See the writer's submission as to the Holmes opinion in Dietrich, text ac• 
companying note 57 supra. 
113. 232 N.Y. 220 (1921). 
114. Id. at 224. 
115. Thus Dean White wrote: "In fact, considerations of duty are never the sub• 
stantive reasons for a: decision but only the legal sounding explanation for it." White, 
The Right of Recovery for Prenatal Injuries, 12 LA. L. REv. 383, 401 (1952). See also 
Payne, Foresight and Remoteness of Damage in Negligence, 25 MODERN L. REv. 1, 18 
(1962). 
116. 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935). 
117. Id. at 359, 78 S.W.2d at 949. 
118. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 18.3, at 1030 (1956). 
119. Ibid. The actor's knowledge requirement was applied only in Walker's case. 
One text writer applauds the holding of non-liability because the company did not 
know of the child's existence. WINFIELD, TORTS 71·72 (7th ed. 1963). This is reminiscent 
of the "tumor cases," justifying liability on the part of doctors because they obviously 
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Perhaps the learned authors have been a little harsh in their 
criticism, for it is arguable that the court was not thinking in this 
subjective sense, but was postulating the anticipation of the reason-
able man, who saddles the instant defendant with responsibility 
only insofar as he (the reasonable man) knows the interests to be 
within the range of peril. This becomes clear when regard is had 
to the court's further holding that: "We think that tested by the 
knowledge, experience and conduct of the ordinary prudent man, 
it 'owed no duty of care to the unborn child in the present case, 
apart from the duty to avoid injuring the mother.' "120 
It is true that this statement is similar to that delivered in Drob-
ner, but with this important distinction: the Texas court by its 
preamble set a standard, whereas the Drobner court merely stated a 
conclusion. A causal approach cannot avoid the issue,121 because it is 
still open to the defendant to say that he, as a reasonable man, could 
not have anticipated the presence of an unborn child within the 
risks created by his conduct. 
Professor Goodhart, who has been the leading exponent of the 
abolition of a distinction between foreseeability for the purpose 
of culpability and foreseeability for the purpose of compensation, 
was driven to submit that in fact it is reasonably foreseeable that 
a victim may suffer from an unusual susceptibility.122 Dr. Williams 
disagreed, submitting that there is a distinction with respect to 
foreseeability between the test of initial liability and the test of 
extent of liability.123 Pregnancy as an unusual susceptibility is 
relevant not only to the question of quantum but also to the 
question of liability. Therefore, we are required to take the fact of 
pregnancy out of the victim talem qualem category and place it 
squarely within the risk principle. Dr. Williams would rationalize 
the matter in the last resort under his doctrine of transferred negli-
gence,124 but it does seem essential that the standard be reformu-
have knowledge of the mother's condition. In terms of established tort principle, this 
view is quite objectionable. See also FLEMING, TORTS 158 (1957). But this is not what 
the Texas court embraced. 
120. 124 Tex. at 355, 78 S.W.2d at 947. (Emphasis added.) 
121. SALMOND, TORTS 81-82 (13th ed. 1961). The author states that it is difficult to 
see how a duty of care can be owed to an unborn person, but takes this question 
no further since he finds the real issue to be whether a living plaintiff has a 
right not to be injured by acts done before its birth. 
122. Goodhart, Liability and Compensation, 76 L.Q. REv. 567, 581 (1960); Note, 
78 L.Q. REv. 160, 161-62 (1962). This drew a retort from Dias in a note in 1961 CAMB. 
L.J. 23, 27: "If the full extent of the injury is somehow regarded as being foreseeable 
'the average reasonable man' and 'the man on the Clapham omnibus' will have to 
give way to some new and nameless figure credited with far greater powers than his 
predecessors." 
123. Williams, supra note 109, at 175. 
124. If Dr. Williams regards "advanced in pregnancy" as being any sort of require-
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lated to ensure that Scarlett O'Hara also tumbles down the stairs 
of foresight in law. 
Alternatively, we must answer Professor Keeton's question of 
whether we consider the plaintiff within some class of persons to 
whom risk could be foreseen, the class being circumscribed by the 
limits of the risk,125 by stating that conduct which creates a risk of 
harm to a woman includes also a risk of harm to her unborn child, 
if any. 
B. Causation126 
Once upon a time there was a camel that carried loads across 
the desert for its master, who had never loaded the animal too 
heavily. One day a prankster negligently placed a straw on top of 
a load and the camel collapsed, falling to the ground with a broken 
back.127 Lawyers, to the horror of the medical profession, 128 often 
embrace the last straw theory of causation. Given an act or omis-
sion but for which the harm would not have ensued, the law may 
hold the actor liable for all damages. 
The doctor has another view of causation. His emphasis is 
upon the initial rather than the immediate cause, with only a few 
exceptions such as the situation where A negligently dispenses 
poison pills that B swallows some weeks later; here the doctor con-
siders the taking of the poison as the cause of B's death, while to 
the lawyer, the cause was the negligent dispensing.129 
In prenatal injury cases, the doctor, as an expert witness,180 will 
be asked to establish causation in the legal sense, and in so 
doing he will be dealing with a concept of causation that is not 
only foreign to his concept of cause or etiology, but is also foreign 
to the traditions of his science.181 Scientific cause is firmly rooted 
ment, then, if maternal appearance is going to be a criterion, he is coming frightfully 
close to the unjust viability test or the unfair knowledge test. 
125. KEEToN, op. cit. supra note 109, at 83. See also CLARK &: LINDSELL, TOR.TS § 702 
(12th ed. 1961). 
126. There are so many theories of causation and such a great deal has been writ• 
ten on this subject that it would be impossible to report, let alone attempt to reconcile, 
them within the scope of this paper. I have had to make an election and, in so doing, 
confess the choice to be purely personal. Recent writings in this field include: 2 HAR.PER. 
&: JAMES, TOR.TS ch. 20 (1956); HART&: HONORE, CAUSATION IN TIIE LAW (1959); Kn:roN, 
op. cit. supra note 109; PROSSER, TORTS § 44, at 219-~ (2d ed. 1955): Williams, Causa• 
tion in the Law, 1961 CAMB. L.J. 62. 
127. This example is taken with modifications from the opinion of Chief Justice 
Bernstein in Tatman v. Provincial Homes, 382 P .2d 573 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. 196!1). 
128. See Powers, After All Doctors Are Human, 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 46ll, 477 (196!1); 
Small, Gaffing at a Thing Called Cause, !H TEXAS L. REv. 6l!O, 6lll (195!1). 
129. The example is taken from Williams, supra note 126, at 64. 
130. There seems little doubt but that the question of causation in prenatal injury 
cases will require expert testimony. See Durivage v. Tufts, 94 N.H. 265, 51 A.2d 847 
(1947); llO U. PA. L. REv. 553, 590 (1962). 
131. Small, supra note 128, at 648-56. 
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on a principle of repetition-there is a tendency to relate statistical 
relevance to causal relevance. This is not to say, however, that such 
absurdity results as finding a causal relevance between motor acci-
dents and nylon stockings because most women involved in the 
former wear the latter. The doctor's cause tends to be something 
he has already proved. To him causes are either notorious or un-
known, and, to the frustration of the lawyer, the area in between 
presents only possibilities. 
Lawyers do not rank causes; percentages are not tacked onto 
them. In one case and in one set of circumstances the lawyer seeks 
to close the causal link by proving that degree of factual relevancy 
the law is prepared to label as a cause.132 The lawyer does not seek 
the cause but a cause,183 and in his search he asks the question, but 
for act A would harm B have resulted. If the answer is in the 
negative and if its probity is not so slight as to warrant being 
discarded under the de minimis principle,134 then the lawyer's 
task as to causation, although not necessarily as to liability, is 
complete. Liability is fixed by balancing all the causes-called 
causes-in-fact. If on balance a cause that can be attributed to the 
defendant's fault is isolated as the more important, he is saddled 
with responsibility. 
The gulf between the professions is the difference between 
scientific integrity and policy expediency. Mutual frustration flows 
between. 
Doctors, unfortunately, employ legal-sounding tests; Dr. Fraser 
has written that: "Proof of a causal association requires evidence 
that the factor occurs more often in pregnancies giving rise to 
malformed children than in pregnancies giving rise to normal 
children."185 This is not the lawyer's test of a cause-in-fact; it is an 
expression of the test by which responsibility is determined. The 
balancing of probabilities is a procedure; the result is as variable 
as the factual circumstances of any two cases. 
Prenatal in jury cases will in the foreseeable future be tried 
with a crowd of medical witnesses, and it ought to be understood 
132. But see PROSSER., To.RTS § 44 (2d ed. 1955). Although the singular word "cause" 
is used here for the purpose of clarity, there is never a single, isolated cause of any oc-
currence. In addition there is often more than one cause justifying liability on the part 
of the particular defendant. I have merely attempted to illustrate the process whereby 
a "cause" is characterized. In a trial this process is repeated a number of times. 
133. 2 HARP.ER &: JAMES, TORTS § 20.2, at 1110 (1956). 
134. See, e.g., McKE.R.RoN, THE I.Aw OF DELier 258 (1959). 
135. Fraser, Causes of Congenital Malformations in Human Beings, 10 J. CHRONIC 
DISEASES 97, 107 (1959). 
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that all the law requires is a matching of causes. One of them 
it calls the legal cause, and the isolation that follows this appella-
tion should not be taken to mean that it is the only cause. It is 
merely the only cause with which Justice may saddle the ·wrong-
doer with liability. That is where it seeks its validity-not in scien-
tific isolation. 
The victim talem qualem rule presents problems to doctors. 
It is merely an expression of a legal policy that a wrong-
doer must take his victim with all his susceptibilities, abnormalities, 
and propensities. Thus, in Smith v. Leech, Brain & Co.,186 the 
plaintiff's husband was employed by the defendant company as a 
galvanizer. His duties consisted of lowering articles into a tank of 
molten metal. Once, while so engaged, a piece of metal spattered 
out and burned his lip. The workman died of cancer, his tissues 
at the time of the accident being in a pre-malignant condition. The 
defendants were held liable for the death of their employee, the 
court having found that the burn caused the cancer. This ought 
not to be understood to mean that lawyers embrace, as a 
scientific principle, the belief that burns cause cancer; it only means 
that where a pre-existing dangerous condition is aggravated by a 
burn on the lip, that burn is the legal cause of the cancer. 
The trauma-causation field is the battleground of medico-legal 
dispute, and, as most of the cas_es relating to prenatal injuries have 
dealt with allegations of a traumatic cause, it is to be expected that 
further professional difficulties will occur.137 
In those jurisdictions in which the courts have allowed ·wrongful 
death actions to be brought by the beneficiaries of stillborn infants, 
the fact of an unhealthy pregnancy quite probably may be regarded 
as irrelevant because of the victim talem qualem rule and the 
defendant held liable for causing the abortion. Difficulties might 
arise, however, if it could be established-and it seems that this 
will have to be done by the defendant-that the health of the fetus 
was such that it would have inevitably and of its own accord 
aborted. If this can be established, the defendant ought not to be 
held liable.138 
136. (1961] 3 All E.R. 1159. See also Gulf Ref. Co. v. Atchison, 196 F.2d 258 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 833 (1952); Love v. Port Authority, [1959] Ll. L. Rep. 541. 
137. EASTMAN &: HELLMAN, WILLIAMS' 0BSTE"IRICS 531-32 (12th ed. 1961). See also 
Hertig, Minimal Criteria Required To Prove a Prima Facie Case of Traumatic Abor-
tion, 117 ANN. SURGERY 496 (1943). See text at note 272 infra. 
138. See 2 HARPER &: JAMES, TORTS § 20.3, at 1122-23 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS § 44, at 
219-20 (2d ed. 1955); Peaslee, Multiple Causation and Damage, 47 HARV. L. REV. 
1127 (1934). 
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IV. RELEVANT MEDICAL DATA139 
A. Research in the Area 
603 
As we have seen, during the formative period of the law the 
courts denied relief to the infant plaintiffs, not upon any basic juris-
prudential foundation, but upon errors of science. Medicine also 
proceeded for years upon the supposition that the cause of congeni-
tal malformation lay in hereditary factors. The landmarks in 
medical knowledge respecting the role of environmental factors were 
reached almost simultaneously with those of the law. 
Gregg's paper on the Rubella virus appeared in 1942.140 In the 
1950's, irradiation was convincingly indicted,141 and we have in 
recent years witnessed the devastating consequences of a sleeping 
drug.142 . 
As of the present day, doctors and investigators are satisfied 
that environment plays an integral role in the etiology of congenital 
malformations;143 there is general agreement that environment can 
be a catalyst to heredity,144 and vice versa. Areas of disagreement 
are, on the whole, confined to whether specific environmental in-
fluences are causes of malformations. We have considered the 
difficulties present in the concept of medical cause.145 It seems ad-
visable not to limit the inquiry in this manner, but to consider 
also those factors present in the fetal environment that might con-
tribute to congenital malformations. 
Environmental factors may be broadly divided into two classes: 
environmental deficiencies and environmental agents. Under the 
139. See Appendix infra. 
140. Gregg, Congenital Cataract Following German Measles in the Mother, 3 TR. 
OPTH. Soc'y AUSTRALIA 35 (1941). See text accompanying note 202 infra. 
141. Miller, Delayed Effects Occurring Within the First Decade After Exposure of 
Young Individuals to Hiroshima Atomic Bomb, 18 PEDIATRICS I (1956); Plummer, Ano-
malies Occurring in Children Exposed in Utero to the Atomic Bomb in Hiroshima, 10 
PEDIATRICS 687 (1952); Yamazaki et al., A Study of the Outcome of Pregnancy in Women 
Exposed to the Atomic Blast in Nagasaki, 43 J. CELL PHYSI0L. (Supp. 1 1954) 319. See 
text accompanying note 223 infra. 
142. Lenz &: Knapp, Thalidomide Embryopath'j, 5 ARCH. ENv. HEALTH 100 (1962). 
Sec text accompanying note 249 infra. 
143. EAsTMAN &: HELLMAN, WILLIAMS' OBSTETRICS 527 (12th ed. 1961). See generally 
NESBITI', PERINATAL Loss IN MODERN OBSTETRICS 237-68 (1957) [hereinafter referred to as 
NESnITTJ; Fraser, Causes of Congenital Malformations in Human Beings, 10 J. CHRON. 
DIS. 97 (1959); Fraser 8: Fainstat, Causes of Congenital Defects, 82 AM. J. DIS. CHILD. 
593 (1951); Gruenwald, Mechanisms of Abnormal Development (pts. 1-3), 44 ARcH. 
PATH. 398, 495, 648 (1947); Inghalls, Causes and Prevention of Developmental Defects, 
161 A.M.A.J. 1047 (1956); Penrose, Heredity and Environment in the Causation of 
Foetal Malformation, 166 PRACTITIONER 429 (1951); Wacker, Congenital Abnormalities, 
86 AM. J. OBST. &: GYNEC. 310 (1963); Warkany &: Kalter, Congenital Malformations 
(pts. 1·2), 265 NEW ENG. J. MED, 993, 1046 (1961). 
144. AREY, DEVELOPMENTAL ANATOMY 7 (6th ed. 1954); Warkany &: Kalter, supra 
note 143, at 1050. 
145. See text accompanying note 131 supra. 
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first heading may be assigned socio-economic factors,146 geographi-
cal factors,147 nutritional deficiencies,148 maternal age149 and 
health,150 and psychological elements,151 all of which may be relevant 
to the intrauterine development of the infant. 
146. This is closely related to nutritional factors, as the lower the status the poorer 
the diet tends to become. 
147. See, e.g., Edwards, Congenital Malformations of the Central Nervous System 
in Scotland, 12 BRIT. J. PREV. &: SocIAL MED. 115 (1958); Penrose, Genetics of Anen-
cephaly, 1 J. MENT. DEFic. REs. 4 (1957); cf. Hewitt, Geographical Variations in the 
Mortality Attributed to Spina Bifida and Other Congenital Malformations, 17 BRIT. 
J. PREV. &: SOCIAL MED. 13 (1963). 
148. There has been a vast amount of research in · this field. Primarily this has 
been related to maternal diets in animals. It was determined that specific vitamin 
deficiencies produced defects. Warkany, Congenital Malformations Induced by Maternal 
Dietary Deficiency, 13 NUTRITION REv. 289 (1955). See also MoNTAGU, PRENATAL lNFLU• 
ENCES 57-112 (1962) [hereinafter referred to as MoNTAGu]. Montagu expresses concern 
at the "fashionable" practice of adolescent females to remain slim through poor diets. 
That, combined with the increasing trend toward young marriages and pregnancies, 
creates a situation in which the mother often cannot provide a satisfactory environ-
ment for the healthy building of another body. Id. at 59. 
See also Fraser &: Fainstat, supra note 143, at 598-600; Sontag &: Wines, Relation of 
Mothers' Diets to Status of Their Infants at Birth and in Infancy, 54 AM. J. OBSTET. &: 
GYNEC. 994 (1947); Tompkins, The Underweight Patient as an Increased Obstetric 
Hazard, 69 AM. J. OBSTET. &: GYNEC. 114 (1955). 
There is almost no scope for legal liability here, as, whatever relevance the maternal 
diet has, pre-conception dietary behavior and socio-economic factors provide too wide 
and all encompassing variables for any duty to be distilled. Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. 
Rankin, 59 Wash. 288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962); cf. 110 U. PA. L. REv. 553, 582-8!! (1962). 
The only "unequivocal" link to be established between the maternal diet and de-
fects in humans are the iodine deficiencies that give rise to endemic cretinism. This 
has provided a particular problem for Switzerland. See MoNTAGU 97; WRIGHT, INTRO· 
DUCTION TO PATHOLOGY, ETIOLOGY, THE CAUSES OF ABNORMALITIES AND DISEASES (3d ed. 
1958), quoted in CURRAN, LAW AND MEDICINE 29, 33 (1960). 
Too much iodine, on the other hand, has caused the same condition. Galina, Iodides 
During Pregnancy, 267 A.M.A.J. 1124 (1962). 
149. The optimum childbearing age is between twenty-three and twenty-eight. 
MONTAGU 117. GLAISTER, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE AND TOXICOLOGY 358 (11th ed. 1962), 
has collected data on maternal age at childbirth. This ranges from an incredible five 
years eight months to past fifty. In the September 20, 1963 issue of Time Magazine, a 
prize is reported for the submission of documentary evidence of a birth that will "beat" 
the "record" of one Hilda Gosney who gave birth at the age of fifty years seven 
months! Id. at 102. 
150. Rubella and syphilis are dealt with in the text accompanying notes 202-22 infra. 
Pregnancy can give rise to a maternal toxemic condition, the exact cause of which 
is unknown although numerous theories from hereditary factors to the uterine localiza-
tion of the placenta abound. See Beinarz, in VILLEE, GESTATION 109 (1959). The condi-
tion may affect the fetus. MoNTAGU 241. The issue of diabetic women have a high 
mortality rate. But what is important to the lawyer is the fact that a diabetic who has 
been subjected to a traumatic experience such as a motor vehicle collision may experi-
ence an aggravation of her condition with resulting deleterious consequences for the 
fetus. Again, a traumatic experience can push a pre-diabetic mother over the line. A 
defendant can be responsible in both these cases for whatever aggravation may ensue. 
See Joslin, The Relation of Trauma to Diabetes, 177 ANN. SURG. 607 (1943). See also 
CURRAN, LAw AND MEDICINE 51 n.18 (1960). 
In Valence v. Louisiana Light&: Power Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. 1951), a mother alleged 
that she was between two and four months pregnant when she was a passenger in a bus 
that was negligently driven off the road into a ditch. The mother apparently received 
"only a slight jolt," but shortly afterwards she experienced a slight uterine discharge 
and a week later she was confined to a hospital for ten days. Five and one-half months 
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On the other hand, environmental agents are, broadly speaking, 
not subtractions, but positive influences. Medical science today can 
condemn with varying degrees of certainty a wide variety of 
teratogenic agents and stimuli that are capable of effecting 
abnormalities.152 
It is obviously not permissible or feasible for experiments to 
be carried out upon humans, 153 and the studies that have been 
undertaken must all be considered subject to a number of qualifica-
tions that may be relevant to their overall validity and acceptance.154 
The problem of the accuracy in human investigation relates, inter 
alia, to maternal memory and bias, the necessity for retrospective 
investigation, the paucity of subjects, and the differences between 
the methods used by the various investigators and their differing 
views as to what constitutes a malformation.155 
Hope for more accuracy in the future is to be found in the 
Collaborative Perinatal Research Project, presently carrying out its 
work at Bethesda, Maryland. There it is intended to follow up the 
outcome of approximately fifty thousand pregnancies in order to ex-
amine in depth the precise effect of already suspect factors, to investi-
gate and identify factors not presently suspect, and to elucidate the 
mechanism by which these factors exert their influence. As of June 
1963, 36,500 women were under study, approximately 29,000 had 
already been delivered, and 17,400 one-year-old children had been 
after the accident she gave birth to a stillborn infant weighing an incredible fourteen 
pounds. There was evidence that the mother was a diabetic who, five years before the 
accident, had given birth to a stillborn child. In addition, there was some evidence that 
she had failed to adhere to her diet. Her contention was that as a result of the ac-
cident she had been required to stay in bed for a large part of the gestation period 
and that her resultant obesity produced the secondary result that her child's weight 
also became excessive. The court, in rejecting this explanation, held that the lack of 
exercise and increased weight of the mother could not have affected the fetus. Noting 
her previous history, the fact that she was a diabetic, and the mortality rate of chil-
dren from such mothers, the court refused to grant any relief, stating that only a 
layman might attribute the result to the accident. 
151. See Yankauer, An Evaluation of Prenatal Care and Its Relationship to Sodal 
Class and Sodal Disorganization, 43 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1001 (1953). 
152. Fraser, Causes of Congenital Malformations in Human Beings, 10 J. CHRON. 
DIS. 97 (1959). The author of that article is prepared to implicate only five agents: (i) 
radiation, therapeutic and atomic; (ii) rubella; (iii) toxoplasma organism; (iv) acute 
folic acid deficiencies; (v) synthetic progestins. As we have seen, his definition of cause 
is legally unacceptable. Warkany &: Kalter, supra note 143, do not go much further. 
153. HAMILTON, BOYD &: MOSSMAN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 206 (3d ed. 1962); Macintosh, 
The Problem of Congenital Malformations, IO J. CHRON. DIS. 139, 142 (1959). 
154, Fraser, supra note 152, at 100, sets out the methods presently adopted. 
155. See Macintosh, supra note 153. Thus it is impossible to undertake any pros-
pective investigations relating to toxaplasmosis, as a large number of women afflicted 
with the disease do not know that they have it. Warkany &: Kalter, supra note 14S, at 
1047 (1961). 
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subjected to examination.156 It is still too early for any authoritative 
findings to be announced, but the investigators estimate that the 
abnormal outcomes will include:157 
(i) Prematurity: 10 per cent. 
(ii) Congenital malformations: 7 per cent. 
(iii) Stillbirths and neo-natal deaths: 3.6 per cent. 
(iv) Mental retardation: 3 per cent. 
A great deal of the information we possess at present has resulted 
from animal experimentation. This has its sequelae both for the 
doctor and the lawyer, because the information must be considered 
with a degree of caution. Two eminent teratologists, however, have 
said: 
"Thus, while one must caution that production of a specific 
congenital malformation in a laboratory animal by a particular 
means certainly does not imply that that defect has the same 
etiology in man, these studies reveal the existence of embry-
ologic instabilities in mammals that can be transformed into 
malformations by environmental factors, and allude that such 
phenomena may also exist during human prenatal life."158 
On the other hand, the position can be the reverse. For example, 
aminopterin has a far more severe effect on human fetuses than 
on rat fetuses. 
B. Critical Times and Environmental Agents 
The precise mechanism by which teratogenic agents exert their 
influences is in many cases unknown. The popular hypothesis is 
that described as the developmental arrest theory.159 
Embryologists have discovered and tabulated the sequences of 
normal development, 160 and it has been determined that, at specific 
times and under genetic control, stages are reached at which the 
156. The children will receive their final thorough examination when they reach 
the age of seven years. 
157. Collaborative Project Reporter, The Collaborative Perinatal Research Project: 
5 Years of Progress, Autumn, 1963. 
158. Warkany & Kalter, supra note 143, at 1049 (1961). 
159. Inghalls, Causes and Prevention of Developmental Defects, 161 A.M.A.J. 1047 
(1956). The theory itself is not novel. See OGSTON, LECTURES ON MEDICAL JuRISPRU· 
DENCE 196 (1878). The great problem here relates to the fact that it is probably inac-
curate to trace all abnormalities to one theory. The very word "arrest" would exclude 
those factors that cause persons to become "giants" (usually genetic factors are in-
volved in this situation). Dr. Inghalls has been accused of putting all his "eggs in one 
basket." See Gruenwald's letter, in 162 A.M.A.J. 1077 (1956); Fraser's letter, in id. at 
1651 (1956). It is extremely difficult for a lawyer to weigh all the pros and cons, for 
the simple reason that doctors generally do not write for the benefit of lawyers. Thus, 
everything Dr. Fraser writes in his letter must be read subject to his definition of 
"cause,'' the problems of which are discussed in the text accompanying note 135 supra. 
160. A table of the sequences is set out in AREY, op. cit. supra note 144, at 106. 
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cells develop into tissues and organs. After this, at another critical 
time, proliferation takes place from the foundations so laid. Now, 
if a sufficient dosage of a teratogenic agent exerts its influence at one 
of these critical times, it may be understood that either foundational 
damage (i.e., the influence at a critical differentiating stage) or 
secondary damage, in the sense of inhibiting or arresting the growth 
of organs already formed, may result.161 Overgrowth or failure to 
regress162 is also conceivable, and it has been suggested that this 
may result from excessive hormone stimulation.168 
The critical stages in the differentiating phase occur within the 
first trimester, and a teratogenic factor producing its insult at this 
time will result in a great variety of defects, likely to be of a 
serious nature.164 As the organs grow, their susceptibility to struc-
tural damage decreases, and arrest or degeneration will be the result 
of an insult. Each organ, however, has its own critical stage, and 
within the teratogenic zone the potential sequelae range from death 
to major, minor, or no defects.165 Since a specific defect can be 
caused by a variety of unrelated agents, it is hazardous to work 
back from the deformity in the hope of isolating the cause.166 
The variables are, therefore, the teratogenic dosage and the stage 
of fetal development. Dr. Inghalls submits that the sequences of 
normal development also determine the sequences of maldevelop-
ment, and thus, given the malformation, it may be possible to deter-
mine the time at which the adverse influence was exerted.167 
Doctors Warkany and Kalter have warned, however, that: 
"Another possible fallacy is attributing certain congenital mal-
formations or syndromes to environmental events that coincide 
with the time of embryological development of the part or parts 
that became malformed . . . because in theory any interfer-
ence with embryogenesis before such developmental milestones 
could also be responsible for the defects or a mutational or 
chromosomal aberration dating from before conception can 
manifest itself at such a 'critical period.' "168 
They go on to submit, therefore, that it is permissible only to 
apply the critical time basis as a means of determining the latest 
time the origin of the malformation could have exerted its influence. 
161. lnghalls, supra note 159, at 1051. • 
162, NESBilT 237; PATTEN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 231-32 (2d ed. 1953). 
163. Wilson, Experimental Studies on Congenital Malformations, 10 J. CHRON. DIS. 
m. 115 (1959). 
164. Id. at 119. 
165. NESBilT 245-46. 
166. Cf. PATTEN, op. cit. supra note 162, at 230. 
167. Inghalls & Curley, Principles Governing the Genesis of Congenital Malforma-
tions Induced in Mice by Hypoxia, 257 NEW ENG. J. Mm. ll21, 1126 (1958). 
168. Warkany & Kalter, supra note 143, at 1050. 
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As a consequence, medical certainty will be found only in this 
negative sense. However, the rendering of a dormant factor into an 
active one is not necessarily excusable in law.169 
Provided the malformation is such that an expert is able to 
determine whether it is the result of foundational damage or 
an arrest in proliferation, it is possible to state with reasonable 
certainty when the environmental agent must have produced 
its insult. The former malformation should have its origin in 
the first trimester, but the latter not necessarily so. There-
fore, a plaintiff suffering from structural damage may find it im-
possible to succeed in his cause of action if the alleged wrongful act 
took place after the first trimester. 
It must also be remembered that, if we accept that the factors 
causing uterine death may also be responsible for sublethal damage, 
this, combined with the fact that medical science is unable to ac-
count for the majority of prenatal deaths, means that medicine 
cannot account for the majority of malformations either. This has 
been so despite thorough post mortem examination of the infant 
and accurate clinical data regarding the mother.170 
Teratogenic agents either upset the developmental pattern di-
rectly or affect it by subtracting an external component necessary 
to healthy intrauterine life. The developmental arrest theory is 
relevant not only to anatomical malformations, but also to mental 
abnormalities, though doctors can speak with even less certainty as 
to the etiology of the latter. Perinatal anoxia, however, has been 
singled out as a possible cause of these mental deviations. 
C. The Effects of Specific Environmental Agents 
We all live in societies that are maimed by the high incidence 
of cerebral palsy, epilepsy, mental retardation and deficiencies, be-
havior disorders, and minor impediments. 
Doctors are now satisfied that not all these afflictions can be 
attributed to hereditary factors, as studies of epilepsy have shown.171 
Since these disorders usually reveal themselves in childhood, investi-
gators have increasingly looked toward the perinatal period in 
order to ascertain their cause. 
I. Anoxia 
It is known that the greatest single cause of infant mortality is 
anoxia, and, knowing that deprivation of oxygen can kill, it seems 
169. See text accompanying note 137 supra. 
170. NESBIIT 99; Wilson, supra. note 163, at 123. 
171. BARROW 8: FABING, EPILEPSY AND THE LAW 7, 11-34 (1956). Cerebral palsy is in 
addition rarely hereditary. NESBITI 191. 
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reasonable to conclude that it may also maim. Investigators have 
found that anoxia causes hemorrhages that may inflict serious dam-
age to the coverings (pia mater; arachnoid) and white matter of 
the brain. The resultant destruction of nerve cells can be associated 
with the impairment of the function of certain areas of the brain.172 
The fetus, while in utero, is able to withstand without distress an 
• oxygen pressure that would be found at an altitude of some thirty-
three thousand feet. But this capacity to withstand low oxygen pres-
sures does not mean that the fetus is able to tolerate a depression of 
its usual oxygen level for any appreciable length of time.173 
A link between hyperoxia (too much oxygen) and blindness 
caused through retrolental fibroplasia has also been established.174 
All these facts provide strong indicia which led Doctors Lilienfeld 
and Passamanick to undertake a mammoth series of studies in an 
attempt to link brain disorders to perinatal factors. 
They have suggested the existence of a continuum of reproduc-
tive casualty which, ranging from death through cerebral palsy, 
epilepsy,175 mental deficiency,176 and behavior disorders177 to read-
ing disorders,178 is statistically relevant to the complications of preg-
nancy and prematurity. Factors include the duration of labor, 
malpresentations, multiple births, and placental disorders and dis-
eases such as placenta previa, all of which may affect the maternal 
oxygenated blood supply to the fetus. 
Concurrent with these inquiries, studies have been conducted of 
various drugs that can have a depressant effect on the respiratory 
system. This effect may be direct, resulting in a fetal inability to 
metabolize drugs that have passed transplacentally, or indirect, re-
acting upon the respiratory processes of the mother.179 
Anesthetics, certain analgesics (pain killers), and sedatives 
have a depressant effect on the respiratory system, and thus Dr. 
Montagu has submitted that, since all anesthetics and most sedative 
172. MONTAGU 336-37. 
173. Eastman, Mount Everest in Utero, 67 AM. J. OBST.&: GYNEC. 701, 707 (1954). 
174. Id. at 711. 
175. Lilicnfeld &: Pasamanick, The Association of Maternal and Fetal Factors With 
the Development of Cerebral Palsy and Epilepsy, 70 AM. J. OBSTET. &: GYNEC. 93 (1955). 
176. Lilienfeld &: Pasamanick, Association of Maternal and Fetal Factors With the 
Development of Mental Deficiency (pt. 1), 159 A.M.A.J. 155 (1955) and see id. (pt. 2), 
60 AM. J. MENT. DEFIC. 557 (1956). Prematurity was found to be of particular relevance 
in these studies. 
177. Pasamanick, Rogers &: Lilienfeld, Pregnancy Experience and the Development 
of Behavior Disorder in Children, 112 AM. J. PSYCHIA1RY 613 (1956). See also Preston, 
Late Behavioral Aspects Found in Cases of Prenatal, Natal and Postnatal Anoxia, 26 
J. PEDIATlUCS 353 (1945). 
178. Kawi &: Pasamanick, Association of Factors of Pregnancy With the Development 
of Reading Disorders in Childhood, 166 A.M.A.J. 1420 (1958). 
179. Sandberg, Drugs in Pregnancy, Their Effects on the Fetus and Newborn, 94 
CALIF. MED. 287 (1961). See generally MONTACU 322-60; NESBI'IT 110, 355. 
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and pain-relieving drugs serve to reduce the oxygen levels of both 
mother and fetus, in those cases in which such drugs must be used 
the obvious indication is that they should be used with the greatest 
caution.180 
Dr. Inghalls attributes a great deal to anoxia;181 Dr. Warkany is 
dubious.182 The cause of these serious disorders is unknown; but an-
oxia is conceivably a cause, and, that being so, it seems that Dr. East-
man's recommendation in his Presidential Address to the 64th Annual 
Meeting of the American Association of Obstetricians ought to be 
followed. He suggested that oxygen should be administered to the 
mother as a matter of course during the last five to fifteen minutes 
of childbirth in order to protect the baby which may require it.188 
It is not submitted tf.iat any such standard of obstetrical practice 
be required by law. The law's strength really lies in its ability to 
compensate. A preventive law in the sense of naked compulsion is 
uncalled for against a body of men intimately concerned with pre-
natal salvage. Obstetric standards required by law are high enough. 
The doctor who does not know the extent of the mother's anesthe-
tized condition or who has not adopted impeccable care during 
delivery may well be presented with an emergency. His capacity to 
stay out of court is going to be directly proportional to his ability 
to save the cyanosized infant by resuscitation techniques and his 
gen~ral skill in handling the situation.184 
2. -Diseases 
Certain diseases entering into the fetal environment may have 
serious effects upon the child. In this class of case, the limits of lia-
180. MONTAGU 341-42. See also Hellman&: Hingson, The Effect of Various Methods 
of Obstetric Pain Relief on Infant Mortality, 53 N.Y.S.J. MED. 2767 (1953). • 
181. Inghalls, Anoxia as a Cause of Fetal Death and Congenital Defect in the 
Mouse, 80 AM. J. DIS. CHILD. 34 (1950); Inghalls &: Curley, supra note 167, at ll21. 
182. Warkany &: Kalter, supra note 143, at 1047. See also Campbell, The Effects of 
Neonatal Asphyxia, 25 ARcHIV. DIS. CHILD. 351 (1950). Neonatal asphyxia is not a com-
mon cause of later mental or physical retardation. Cf. Fraser, Neonatal Asphyxia, 171 
A.M.A.J. 1028 (1959)-a note of his report to the 15th British Congress of Obstetrics 
and Gynaecology, wherein he maintains a definite association exists between asphyxia at 
birth and subsequent epilepsy, lack of coordination, and personality defects. 
183. Quoted in MoNTAGU 333. 
184. An excellent example of this is found in Lewis v. Read, 41 N.J. 121, 193 A.2d 
255 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Here the dispute turned on whether the child's afflictions (deaf, 
dumb, subject to seizures) was the result of a congenital infirmity or the negligence 
of the physician attending at childbirth. 
Another case is reported in the New York Times, Nov. 19, 1964, p. 31, col. 3. There 
a mother and her son recovered 158,000 dollars from the Doctors Hospital in New York 
City. It was alleged that the baby's birth was delayed by pressing towels against his 
head until the obstetrician arrived. Medical experts testified that this could have cut 
off the baby's oxygen supply and caused the irreparable brain damage. The case was 
apparently a complete reversal of the usual malpractice trial, as the plaintiff called 
thirteen witnesses and the defendant, a retired neurologist, one. 
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bility will be narrowed since fault can be found only when a disease 
has been communicated intentionally or negligently to the mother 
and thus to the fetus. Again, limits must be drawn as a practical 
matter, for, even assuming that it be determined with certainty 
that influenza exerts a deleterious effect upon the fetus, it would be 
asking too much of society to require every person who has con-
tracted influenza to isolate himself completely from his fellows. 
The transmission of teratogenic agents from mother to fetus 
usually takes place transplacentally. The placenta functions more 
as a filter1811 than as a barrier.186 Viruses and gases on occasions may 
pass unmodified, but at other times some modification takes place.187 
Transplacental transmission is not, however, the only form of car-
riage, and experiments have determined that some transmission 
between mother and child can take place through the surrounding 
fluids.188 The importance of this lies in the fact that the fetus enjoys 
no period of invincibility. Thus, though certain critical times are 
reached before the placenta functions properly,189 teratogenic agents 
may still have had an opportunity to effect their serious insults. 
Since viruses grow well on young proliferating tissue, 190 the 
consequences of viral infections are likely to be far more severe 
during the first trimester. The sequelae can range from death to 
mild changes, congenital anomalies being somewhere in between.191 
The leading case on the negligent communication of diseases is 
probably Evans v. Liverpool Corporation.192 There the visiting phy-
sician of a convalescent nursing home negligently discharged the 
plaintiff's son, who was still suffering from scarlet fever, with the 
result that the plaintiff's other three children became infected. 
Judgment was in fact rendered for the defendant, but on the basis 
of the now discredited rule that permitted a hospital to escape 
liability for negligent performance of professional duties by 
185. AREY, op. cit. supra note 144, at 139; Sandberg, Drugs in Pregnancy: Their 
Effects on the Fetus and Newborn, 94 CALIF. MED. 267, 287 (1961). 
186. It is an insuperable barrier to bacteria, however, AREY, op. cit. supra note 144, 
at 139. 
187. See MoNTAGU 48; Page, Transfer of Materials Across the Human Placenta, 74 
AM. J. OBSTET. 8: GYNEC. 705 (1957). See generally Earn 8: Nicholson, The Placental 
Circulation, Maternal and Fetal, 63 AM. J. 0BSTET. 8: GYNEC. I (1952); Potter, Placental 
Transmission of Viruses, 74 AM. J. OBSTET. 8: GYNEC. 505 (1957). 
188. MONTAGU 51-56. 
189. The placenta starts to function at about the fourth week, but only does so 
perfectly at the beginning of the fourth month. MoNTAGU 51. 
190. Because certain anti-cancer drugs act in a similar manner, these ought not to 
be administered to pregnant women. MoNTAGU 355. 
191. Adams, Viral Infections in the Embryo, 92 AM. J. DIS. CHILD. 109 (1956); Evans 
8: Brown, Congenital Anomalies and Virus Infections, 87 AM. J. OBSTET. 8: GYNEC. 749 
(1963). 
192. [1906] 1 K.B. 160. See also Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663 
(1919). 
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its staff.193 An interesting aspect of the case was counsel's attempt 
to hold the hospital absolutely liable on a Rylands v. Fletcher194 
analogy. However, the court refused so to extend the principle; thus 
plaintiffs in this class of case will be required to prove defendants' 
negligence. 
In this regard there has been some discussion of a requirement 
of either a contractual relationship between the parties195 or actual 
knowledge of the danger plus a failure to give warning on the part 
of the defendant;196 but it seems likely that all a plaintiff will have 
to show is that the doctor exhibited a lack of skill and care in diag-
nosis197 or discharge.198 As against a layman defendant, questions 
of special skill are irrelevant, and his liability will be grounded 
upon the ordinary principles of negligence. 
With the notable exception of rubella (German measles) and 
syphilis, there has been little evidence and a great deal of specula-
tion as to the ramifications of diseases. Adams and his co-workers 
found that when mice were injected with a human strain of in-
fluenza a decrease in the pregnancy rate and an increase in the fetal 
abnormality rate resulted.199 On the other hand, Hartman and 
Kennedy found that maternal illness during the first trimester of 
pregnancy led to no appreciable increase in the incidence of con-
genital abnormalities. 200 
There is a body of opinion that would include various other con-
tagious diseases, such as measles, chicken pox, and small pox,201 as 
teratogenic. But, until further evidence is forthcoming, they cannot 
be indicted with any great measure of confidence. 
a. Rubella 
The lowly rubella virus has been connected beyond a reasonable 
doubt with a "flush-hand" of abnormalities, including deafness, 
muteness, dental defects, cleft palate, cardiac defects, cataracts, 
193. The rule was abandoned in the United Kingdom in Cassidy v. Ministry of 
Health, [1951] 2 K.B. 343. Some American courts are following suit and shedding this 
unjustifiable immunity. E.g., Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 662, 163 N.Y. Supp. 29 (1958). 
194. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). 
195. E.g., Hales v. Kerr, [1908] 2 K.B. 601. 
196. CLARK & LINDSELL, TORTS § 1775 (12th ed. 1961); cf. Davis v. Rodman, 147 
Ark. 385, 227 S.W. 6\2 (1921). 
197. Jones v. Stanko, 118 Ohio St. 147, 160 N.E. 456 (1928). 
198. Evans v. Liverpool Corp., [1906] 1 K.B. 160. 
199. Adams, supra note 191. See also Leck, Incidence of Malformations Following 
Influenza Epidemics, 17 BRIT. J. PREY. & Soc. MED. 70 (1963). 
200. 5.4%: 5.2%, Hartman & Kennedy, Illness in the First Trimester of Pregnancy, 
38 J. PEDIATRICS 306 (1951); Warkany & Kalter, Congenital Malformations, 265 NEW 
ENG, J. MED. 1046 (1961). 
201. Manson, Logan & ~y, Rubella and Other T'irus Infections During Pregnancy, 
H.M.S.O. 1960. See also MoNTAGU 284-307. 
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mental deficiency, and microcephaly.202 There are two theories as to 
the mechanism of the virus: 
(1) It may prevent normal development by invading the dif-
ferentiating cells; or 
(2) It may invade the embryonic vascular tissue and, by dam-
aging the blood vessels, disturb nutrition.203 
But, whatever the theory, the fact remains that it is one of the most 
destructive of all environmental agents. One of its serious aspects 
is to be found in the fact that the infection may be so mild that not 
even the mother is aware of her condition.204 Maternal immuniza-
tion may not protect the fetus, and it has recently been reported 
that the virus possesses the ability to survive long enough to cause 
defects even when the mother suffered from the infection a few 
weeks before conception.205 
Doctors have suggested that young girls be artificially infected206 
or have encouraged the practice of rubella parties,207 at which the 
mother of an infected daughter would allow her to spread the disease 
among the female offspring of her friends. Besides the fact that 
rubella may have the, albeit rare, consequence of encephalitis,208 
a lawyer can only warn of the increased dangers involved in com-
municating the disease to outsiders, some of whom may conceiv-
ably be pregnant. A rubella party presents precisely such a risk, 
and it is one by reason of which the actor's conduct may be charac-
terized as negligent. Thus the greatest care ought to be taken to 
ensure that the ramifications of what is essentially a good deed do 
not include that which was sought to be avoided. 
The serious nature of German measles early in pregnancy has 
provided the main platform upon which is grounded the medico-
legal desire to clarify the boundaries of criminal abortion.209 There 
is no doubt that a number of abortions are performed each year 
202. Bell, On Rubella in Pregnancy, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 686 (1959); Coffey &: Jessop, 
Rubella and Incidence of Congenital Anomalies, 6 IRISH J. MED. SCI. 1 (1959); Inghalls, 
Rubella, Its Epidemiology and Teratology, 239 AM. J. MED. Sci. 363 (1960); Jackson &: 
Fisch, Deafness Following Rubella, 2 THE LANCET 1241 (1959). 
203. Skinner, .The Rubella Problem, 101 AM. J. Dis. CHILD. 104, 107 (1961). 
204. Wilson, Experimental Studies in Congenital Malformations, IO J. CHRON. DIS. 
Ill, 123 (1959). 
205. Selzer, Virus Isolation, Inclusion Bodies, and Chromosomes in a Rubella-In-
fected Human Embryo, 2 THE LANCET 336, 337 (1963). 
206. Skinner, supra note 203, at 106. 
207, MoNTAGU 283. 
208. Warkany &: Kalter, supra note 200, at 999 (1961). 
209. The critical time is during the first trimester. Id. at 998. See also Pleydell, 
Anencephaly and Other Congenital Anomalies, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 309 (1960). He warns 
of the possibility of destroying healthy pregnancies if the abortion is performed as a 
result of infection during the latter half of the gestation period. After the passing of 
the critical time, infection presents a negligible risk. MoNTAGU 281. 
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upon women who have contracted German measles, and it does 
seem unjust to expect the medical profession to practice in this 
zone of apparent criminality. Rubella certainly presents the most 
appealing case for therapeutic abortion, and it is probable that 
today, because of our knowledge of the disease and its probable 
results when contracted at critical times, such an exception, recog-
nized in law, would not be subject to abuse. 
b. Syphilis 
The venereal disease syphilis is connected with the birth of con-
genitally syphilitic babies and the infliction of deafness and mental 
retardation.210 Most of the knowledge in this field has been culled 
from individual cases.211 Dr. Bonugli has reported that "no grounds 
appear to exist to support a belief that syphilis is spontaneously 
losing its power to attack, damage or destroy the products of con-
ception in the human female."212 
Syphilis is capable of producing its damage at the moment of 
conception. The Civil Senate of the Supreme Court of West Ger-
many held that a cause of action had accrued to an infant plaintiff 
who sued a hospital alleging that, as a result of a negligent blood 
transfusion, the donor of which was syphilitic, plaintiff was caused, 
after her subsequent conception, to be born suffering from con-
genital syphilis.213 But whether a common-law country would recog-
nize a right of action arising from an act that simultaneously harmed 
and created the plaintiff is an open question. 
Adopting a causative approach, it is relatively simple to impeach 
the manufacturer of defective baby food214 or a pharmaceutical 
company that manufactures contraceptive pills which result in faulty 
spermagenesis,215 even though the act of omission takes place not 
only before the birth but also before the conception of the child. 
Holmes' original query must now be answered by saying that it is 
possible to owe a prospective conditional liability to one not yet 
in being.216 In Zepeda v. Zepeda217 it was held that the fathering of 
an illegitimate child was a tort against the child. After going that 
210. Warkany & Kalter, supra note 200, at 1046. 
211. Pleydell, supra note 209, at 312. 
212. Bonugli, Untreated Syphilis, 33 BRIT. J. VENER. DIS. 217, 222 (1957). Syphilis is 
likely to cause the spontaneous premature onset of labor should there be a post-con• 
ception infection. Eastman, Prematurity From the Viewpoint of the Obstetrician, 1 
AM. PRAG. 343 (1947). . 
213. B.G.HZ., 8, 243 (II Civ. Sen. December 20, 1952). 
214. Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227 (1924). 
215. Van der Meiwe, Note, 26 TYD. VIR HED. R-H REG. 294 (1963). 
216. See note 18 supra and accompanying text. 
217. 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963). 
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far, however, the Illinois court refused relief, expressing the view 
that the legislature is the proper body to extend such a remedy. 
The court referred to the prenatal injury cases as follows: 
"The case at bar seems to be the natural result of the present 
course of the law permitting actions for physical injury ever 
closer to the moment of conception. In point of time it goes 
just a little further. The significance of this course to us is 
this: if recovery is to be permitted an infant injured one month 
after conception, why not if injured one week after, one minute 
after or at the moment of conception? It is inevitable that the 
date will be further retrogressed. How can the law distinguish 
the day to day development of life? If there is human life, 
proved by the subsequent birth, then that human life has the 
same rights at the time of conception as it has at any time 
thereafter. There cannot be absolutes in the minute to minute 
progress of life from sperm and ovum to cell, to embryo to 
fetus, to child."21s 
It therefore seems that a congenitally syphilitic child could have 
a right of action arising from the same act by which it is con-
ceived.219 However, in this class of cases the child will have to contro-
vert parental immunity where it still exists.220 It is submitted that 
maternal consent to the act of intercourse ought not to be ex-
tended to deny relief to the child.221 
Closely related to this case would be the question of the right 
of action in the defective offspring of an incestuous union, and 
again it is submitted that the child ought to be able to recover. 
The fact that the child will have to sue through a guardian may 
not present too great a problem, since in certain circumstances, as 
in the syphilis cases, maternal annoyance may suffice.222 But, in the 
incestuous union situation, a harder practical problem is presented. 
3. Irradiation 
The highest percentage of "law suit casualties" in the medical 
profession falls on those specialists practicing in the field of roent-
genology and radiology. 223 Radiologists have been held responsible for 
218. Id. at 249-50. (Emphasis added.) 
219. Cf. Note, 77 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1349 (1964). 
220. See PROSSER, ToRl'S § IOI, at 675-77 (2d ed. 1955). Compare Deziel v. 
Deziel, [1953] I D.L.R. 651, and Young v. Rankin, [1934] S.C. 499. 
221. Hegarty v. Shine, 4 D.L.R. 288 (Irish 1878). If there has been fraud, 
however, the woman may recover. Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 
206 (1920). 
222. FOOTE &: SANDER, CAsES ON FAMILY LAw 5B-21a (temp. ed. 1962), reports a case 
of "paternal annoyance." In that case a husband recovered damages against an abortion-
ist who had performed an illegal abortion upon the wife with her consent. 
223, STETLER &: MORITZ, DOCTOR AND PATII:NT AND THE LAW 421 (4th ed. 1962). 
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causing death,224 injuries through burns,225 and even prompting 
"cancerphobia.''226 At least in South Africa, with reference to radiol-
ogists the implied consent usually found when a patient submits 
to medical treatment will be insufficient unless the doctors fully 
explain the potential dangers and risks involved in therapeutic 
treatment. 227 
There is no doubt that irradiation, be it atomic228 or therapeu-
tic,229 has a detrimental effect on the fetus. Depending upon the 
dosage, the result may be intrauterine death,280 maldevelopment or 
malformation,231 the rendering of the conceptus sterile,232 or the 
causing of mutational changes that may be transmissible to the 
descendants of the irradiated fetus.233 The possibility that negligent 
irradiation may affect the germ cells and thus produce hereditary 
congenital malformations opens up a field of almost perpetual lia-
bility.234 Perhaps the courts, when faced with this problem, may 
limit the liability by compensating the original plaintiff for his 
224. Hess v. Rouse, 22 S.W.2d 1077 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). 
225. Merkle v. Kegerreis, 350 Ill. App. 103, 112 N.E.2d 175 (1953); Simon v. 
Kaplan, 321 Ill. App. 203, 52 N.E.2d 832 (1944); McElroy v. Frost, 268 P.2d 273 
(Okla. 1954); McCaffrey v. Hague, [1949] 4 D.L.R. 291. 
226. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 152 N.E.2d 249 (1958). 
227. Esterhuizen v. Administrator, Transvaal, [1957] So. Afr. L.R. 710; Lym-
bery v. Jeffries, 1925 A.D. 236. See Milner, The Doctor's Dilemma, 74 S.A.L.J. 
384 (1957). 
228. See authorities cited in note 141 supra. Professor Cavers in his recent article, 
Improving Financial Protection of the Public Against the Hazards of Nuclear Power, 
77 HARV. L. REv. 644 (1964), discusses the question of cancer causation only, at p. 669. 
But his arguments as to strict liability are equally relevant in the case of fetal irradia-
tion damage or the case where irradiation may lead to hereditary defects. Cf. Lloyd, 
Liability for Radiation Injuries, 12 CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 33 (1959). Lloyd finds the 
damage (i.e., a radiation injury transmissible to offspring) too uncertain and intangible 
for legal remedy at present. Id. at 52. 
229. There is, however, some dispute as to the ramifications of diagnostic 
dosages. See generally Dunlap, Medicolegal Aspects of Injuries From Exposure 
to Roentgen Rays and Radioactive Substances, 11 Mo. L. REv. 137, 181, 186-88 
(1946); Roland &: Weinberg, Radiation Effect on the Unborn Embryo Immedi• 
ately After Conception, 62 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNEC. 1167 (1951); Stone, Radia-
tion Hazards in Obstetrics and Gynecology, 15 N.Y. MED. 605 (1959). 
230. Mayer, Therapeutic Abortion by. Means of an X-Ray, 32 AM. J. OBS'I'ET. 
&: GYNEC. 945 (1936). 
231. Warkany &: Kalter, supra note 200, at 1048. 
232. A "possibility." MoNTAGU 460. But see Gruenwald, Mechanisms of Ab· 
normal Development, 44 ARcH. PATH. 398, 405 (1947). X-rays are used for sterilization 
purposes. Dunlap, supra note 229, at 181-84. A recent article reports a case in which 
the mother's ovaries were exposed to a therapeutic dosage after which she con• 
ceived a child that has been born. To date no abnormalities have been de• 
tected. Welton &: McSweeney, Successful Pregnancy After Radiation Therapy 
for Carcinoma of the Cervix, 88 AM. J. OBSTET. &: ,GYNEC. 443 (1964). 
233. AREY, DEVELOPMENTAL ANATOMY 185 (6th ed. 1954); Boyd, Damage to 
Chromosomes by Therapeutic Doses of Radioiodine, 1961-1 THE LANCET 997. 
234. Statutes of limitations or prescription do not as a rule run against 
minors. See WINFIELD, TORTS § 804 (7th ed. 1963); Note, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 553, 
574 (1962). 
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inability to procreate normal children, leaving the election whether 
to have children to the plaintiff_ without allowing him again to in-
volve the negligent defendant in a later suit. 
It has been suggested that fifteen or twenty roentgens at the 
fetal site will be sufficient to cause damage.235 The serious nature of 
this submission may be appreciated by reference to the Nolan and 
Patterson report,236 wherein it is stated that one dental X-ray ma-
chine in San Francisco produced 315 r at a single sitting. The 
posture of patients in a dental chair unquestionably exposes the 
pelvic area to the downward X-rays.237 
There is some dispute as to whether the incidence of leukemia 
increases after fetal irradiation, even in diagnostic dosages.238 Some 
further studies are necessary, but it seems clear that the pregnant 
uterus ought never to be exposed to X-rays, no matter how small 
the dosage.289 This will raise problems when the mother requires 
therapeutic treatment in the fetal area, and in these circumstances 
it might be desirable to terminate the pregnancy.240 
Two American decisions have dealt with the question of prenatal 
injuries caused by irradiation. In both, relief was denied as a matter 
of law. In Smith v. Luckhardt,241 a physician negligently diagnosed 
a pregnancy as a tumor of the womb and administered six, one-
half hour X-ray treatments over a period of three months. The 
child, who was born feeble-minded and crippled, lived to the age 
of thirteen years, but died subsequent to the commencement of the 
2!15. NESnnT 249. There is a dispute as to the dosages required in order to 
bring about each type of harm. Warkany &: Kalter, supra note 200, at 1048. 
236. Nolan &: Patterson, Radiation Hazards From the Use of X-Ray Units, 
61 RADIOLOGY 625 (195!1). A dentist was held liable for X-ray bums in Ragin v. 
Zimmerman, 206 Cal. 72!1, 276 Pac. 107 (1929). 
2!17. MONTAGU 458. 
2!18. Cooper &: Steinbeck, Leukemia Following Irradiation in Utero, 3ll BRIT. 
J. RAnroL. 265 (1959); cf. Court, Brown &: Doll, Prospective Study of Leukemia 
Mortality of Children Exposed to Anti-natal Diagnostic Radiography, 53 PROC. 
RoY. Soc'Y MED., 761 (1960); Ford, Fetal Exposure to Diagnostic X-Rays and 
Leukemia and Other Malignant Diseases in Childhood, 22 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 
1093 (1959). 
2!19. MoNTAGU 446-71. An exception may be radioiodine treatment, however, 
for the fetal thyroid functions only after about twelve weeks. Thus the ad-
ministration of radioactive iodine is dangerous only after the elapse of this 
period, See Chapman, The Collection of Radioactive Iodine by the Human Fetal 
Thyroid, 8 J. CLIN. ENDOCRIN. 717 (1948). 
In discussing causation problems, Gamble, in a note in 3 VAND. L. REv. 282 
(1950), suggests the use of X-rays in order to determine damage while the child 
is still in utero. Something of this nature was done in Sox (see text at note 268 infra), 
but it does seem wise not to use X-ray at all. 
240. Nice problems of balancing maternal-fetal interests arise here. See 110 U. 
PA. L. REv. 55!1, 581 (1962). As long as the tragedy in this class of case lies in 
survival rather than death (MoNTAGU 453), it seems that the balance is heavily 
weighted in favor of the mother. 
241. 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N.E.2d 446 (1939). 
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suit. In Stemmer v. Kline,242 however, the child, a microcephalic 
idiot, was still alive at the time suit was brought against a physician 
who, without the use of any one of several tests available and 
solely after a manual examination, also treated a pregnancy as a 
tumor. There has been much justifiable criticism by doctors of the 
relief granted in some of the trauma cases,243 but these two decisions 
represent the zenith of injustice reached under the old rule. It is 
quite clear that in future cases of this type plaintiffs will experience 
little difficulty in succeeding. 
4. Drugs 
As long as there is a justifiable fear of a relationship between 
mental deficiency and perinatal anoxia, anesthetics, analgesics, and 
sedatives are contraindicated.244 There are certain other drugs, how-
ever, that may affect the fetus by interfering directly with em-
bryogenesis. 
a. The Synthetic Progestins 
Synthetic hormone substances, primarily progesterone, have been 
administered to women who threaten to abort, and there have been 
reports of resulting abnormal sexual development in the offspring. 
It is believed that the abnormalities may occur if the substances 
are administered at the critical time when the gonads begin to de-
velop sexually.245 
b. Abortificients 
In 1952, Dr. Thiersch found that 4-aminopteroylglutamic acid 
was a successful therapeutic abortificient.246 Dr. Meltzer re-
ported a case in which he felt it advisable to allow a woman who 
had taken a large quantity of the acid to go to term, as Dr. Thiersch's 
contribution was alone in the field.247 The child born to this 
242. 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (1942). And see Pilgrim v. Landham, 11 
S.E.2d (Ga. App. 1940). 
243. See text accompanying note 274 infra. Criticisms founded on present-day 
medical knowledge of some of the decisions are a little hazardous, however, 
since most matters are heard on demurrer before any evidence has been intro-
duced. The factual allegations set out in the opinions are, to say the least, 
skimpy. 
244. See text accompanying note 180 supra. 
245. The gonads are the generalized sex glands which under hormone ex• 
posure begin to develop sexually during the fifth to eighth week of pregnancy. 
See MONTAGU 349-50. 
246. Thiersch, Therapeutic Abortions With a Folic Acid Antagonist, 4-Ami-
nopteroylglutamic Acid Administered by the Oral Route, 63 AM. J. OnSTEr. &: 
GYNEC. 1298 (1952). 
247. Meltzer, Congenital Anomalies due to Attempted Abortion With .f-Amino• 
pteroylglutamic Acid, 161 A.M.A.J. 1253 (1956). 
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woman exhibited a number of anomalies. -Dr. Warkany reported a 
similar case.248 The acid is a volatile folic acid antagonist, the 
latter compound being essential to healthy uterine growth. 
The likelihood of a child being able to bring an action against 
its mother who has failed in an abortion attempt is, from the prac-
tical point of view, slight. The courts would no doubt entertain 
such an action, but the problems of proof would be almost insur-
mountable. It seems, therefore, that prospective children will be 
protected only by the existence of a criminal sanction. The civil 
law is able to achieve little in this purely preventive field. 
c. Thalidomide 
The drug thalidomide (alpha N-Phthalimide glutarimide) 
achieved immense po:pularity because it did not produce the usual 
side effects of sedatives. It was sold literally by the ton in 
Western Europe, England, Canada, Brazil, and Japan. 
Animal experiments, mainly on horses which are susceptible to 
human sleep-inducing drugs, led to no untoward events. Two at-
tempts at suicide by means of the drug failed. Glowing reports in 
the medical press resulted.249 
The first warning as to possible ill-effects was a suggestion that 
this drug might be a cause of periphereal neuritis,250 but it was not 
until November 8, 1961, that Dr. Lenz in West Germany, concerned 
at the reports of the increasing number of children suffering from 
phocomelia, suspected the drug as being responsible. On November 
15th he warned Grunenthal Chemie, the West German manufac-
turer, of his suspicions. And, on November 20th, at a meeting of 
Dusseldorf Pediatricians, without naming the drug publicly he ex-
pressed his suspicions. Grunenthal withdrew the drug from the 
West German market on November 26th, and radio, TV, and every 
newspaper in West Germany (on their front pages) publicized this 
action, warning pregnant women not to take the tablets.251 
Meanwhile, Dr. Hayman of the British Manufacturing Com-
pany wrote to The Lancet, reporting that the drug had been with-
drawn from the British Market.252 On December 16th an Australian 
doctor, in a letter to the same journal, suggested the link and re-
248. Warkany, Attempted Abortion With Aminopterin, 97. AM. J. DIS. CHILD. 
274 (1959). 
249. See Mellin &: Katzenstein, The Saga of Thalidomide (pts. 1-2), 267 
A.M.A.J. ll84, ll87-90, 1238 (1962). 
250. Florence, Is Thalidomide to Blame1, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 1954 (1960). 
251. Taussig, A Study of the German Outbreak of Phocomelia: The Thalido-
mide Syndrome, 267 A.M.A.J. ll06, 1109 (1962). 
252. 1961-1 THE LANCET 1262. 
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quested his British colleagues to forward any information that they 
might have253 on the effects of the drug upon children in utero. A 
flood of correspondence followed, and reports coming from around 
the world confirmed the worst suspicions.25~ 
The application to sell the drug in the United States was filed 
by the American licensee on September 12, 1960, but, as a result of 
what a Senate committee termed the "insight and courage"255 of 
Dr. Frances Kelsey and despite the tremendous pressure brought by 
the drug company involved,256 thalidomide was never approved for 
sale in the United States. Quantities of the drug, however, were 
dispersed to doctors, and at least nine children suffering from phoco-
melia were born in the United States after their mothers had taken 
thalidomide during the first trimester.257 
The thalidomide tragedy raised interesting questions of law. On 
July 20th the Lord Chancellor, Lord Dilhome, stated that the possi-
bility that the drug caused the ptoduction of defective children 
was not sufficient to establish a "lawful" ground for an abortion. 
In so doing he crossed swords with the irrepressible Lady Summer-
skill.21Ss 
On July 25th suit was brought in the Supreme Court of Arizona, 
plaintiff alleging that she was three months pregnant, had taken 
thalidomide, and desired to undergo an abortion. An immunity 
from prosecution was requested.259 The defendants in their reply 
brief stated that, if the facts were as presented, namely that the 
health of the mother was endangered, then Arizona law would be 
no bar to an abortion. Consequently, the judge ruled that there 
was no legal controversy and dismissed the application.260 
In Liege, Belgium, a young mother, her husband, and her 
family doctor were charged with homicide.261 The state alleged that 
they had killed a seven-day-old phocomelic baby by feeding it 
barbiturate-poisoned milk. At the subsequent trial, which took 
place in dramatic circumstances, the accused were acquitted.262 
253. McBride, in 1961-2 THE LANCET 1358. 
254. E.g., Letters by Lenz, Pfeiffer&: Kosenow, and Speiers in 1962·1 THE LANCET 
45, 303. 
255. S. REP. No. 1744, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 40, 43 (1962). 
256. Including the suggestion of the possibility of a libel action against Dr. Kclscy. 
Id. at 42. 
257. N.Y. Times (Western ed.) Dec. 13, 1962, p. 7, col. 5. 
258. N.Y. Times, July 20, 1962, p. 12, col. 1. 
259. Id., July 26, 1962, p. 25, col. 1. 
260. Id., July 31, 1962, p. 9, cols. 1-2. 
261. Id., Aug. 8, 1962, p. 19, cols. 1-2. 
262. Id., Nov. 11, 1962, p. 1, col. 7. The court was cleared when spectators shouted 
to the jury to acquit the accused (id., Nov. 8, 1962, p. 47, col. 8). On November 10th, 
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At least three civil suits have been filed against the pharmaceu-
tical companies,268 but to date none have come to trial. In West 
Germany, institution of criminal proceedings against the manufac-
turer is still under consideration. 
There are two heartening aspects of the tragedy. The first is the 
responsibility that doctors have accepted in devising, reporting, and 
advising on schemes to take care of thalidomide babies.264 The 
second is the political impetus it gave to reforming drug administra-
tion laws in a number of countries. 
5. Trauma 
The use of physical force against the mother may affect the fetus 
in a number of ways. There may follow a miscarriage (abortion, 
prematurity) or stillbirth. Again, the placenta may become de-
tached, uterine bleeding may ensue, and maternal shock or emo-
tional disturbance can exert a deleterious effect upon the fetus. 
Much medical doubt pervades the question whether maternal 
trauma is a factor relevant to fetal health; it is solely responsible 
for abortions or miscarriages in only a small minority of cases,265 
and it is difficult to see how it can result in congenital malforma-
tions since its mechanism will operate in a subtractive manner 
rather than destroying physically the fetal structure, whether at the 
foundational or proliferational stage.266 That being so, its relationship 
with mental deficiencies becomes relevant, since placental damage 
and shock may affect the oxygen supply. Anoxia as a cause of these 
disorders has been underlined with a great query, and so claims of 
this nature ought to be regarded with a fair measure of skepticism. 
The overwhelming majority of cases reported in this article have 
arisen out of maternal traumatic experience, and it is clear that this 
will continue to provide the most fruitful source of litigation.267 
when the verdict was due to be returned, feeling had run so high in favor of acquittal 
that police had to guard the court house. 
263. (i) By an association of the victims of the drug against Grunenthal and filed 
in Frankfurt. The Observer, July 15, 1962. (ii) Diamond v. Merrell Co., for 2.5 
million dollars. N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1962, p. 24, col. 1. (iii) Harvey v. Grunenthal Chem. 
Co. for 2.2 million dollars, in respect of twin children who were born suffering 
from phocomelia. Id., Oct. 19, 1962, p. 33, col. 1. 
264. E.g., Trueta, Care of Thalidomide Babies, 1962·2 THE 'LANCET 1162. 
265. The child is protected by the physics of its fetal existence in that the surround• 
ing fluids, as a matter of hydraulics, provide a cushioning effect to any external blow. 
PATIEN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 230 (2d ed. 1953); and see McNeil, Acddental Injuries 
to Women, 83 CALIF. MED. 30 (1955). 
266. Gross mechanical injury rarely leads to malformation. See Gruenwald, Mecha• 
nisms of Abnormal Development, 44 .AR.CHIV. PATH, 398, 415 (1947). 
267. Allegations that trauma was responsible for physical abnormalities were not 
proved after trial on the facts in the following cases: Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe 
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But the fetus itself may suffer a direct injury. This will usually 
occur when the maternal abdominal wall has been perforated or 
punctured. Although in most cases such an injury will cause the 
immediate onset of labor or will at least provide sufficient reason 
for a therapeutic abortion, it is also conceivable that this kind of 
wound might lead to fetal infection. 
So far as may be culled from the_ rather scanty factual reports in 
the published decisions, there have been few cases involving a direct 
blow to the fetus, although in Sox v. United States268 the infant 
plaintiff suffered head injuries as a result of a collision in which 
its mother received five fractures in the pelvic region close to the 
child's head. 
The most fruitful potential source of actions with respect to 
direct fetal injury will be force applied during delivery. In this 
class of cases the infant has always succeeded.269 
a. Physical Trauma 
Death. As long as wrongful death actions are allowed in the 
prenatal injury field, traumatic abortion and stillbirth cases are 
going to be brought before the courts. The susceptibilities of some 
women to abort are legend, and many cases have allowed the mother 
Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956); Valence v. Louisiana Light &: Power Co., 
50 So. 2d 847 (La. 1951); Puhl v. Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959). And 
in Durivage v. Tufts, 94 N.H. 265, 51 A.2d 847 (1947), the plaintiff lost because he 
introduced no expert testimony. The plaintiff succeeded after trial in Sox v. United 
States, 187 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.S.C. 1960), and Seattle First Nat'! Bank v. Rankin, 59 
Wash. 288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962). 
The outstanding example of unjustified "causative" success was in the Canadian 
case of Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, 4 D.L.R. 337 (1933), in which the trauma was 
held to be the cause of club feet. It is hazardous to draw conclusions from the scanty 
facts provided in the opinions, but, if the plaintiffs finally succeeded in Von Elbe v. 
Studebaker-Packard, 15 Pa. D. &: C. 2d 629 (1958) (three months after accident born 
with an "expanded" heart, collapsed lung, and clubbing of the right foot) and Smith 
v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960) (born seventy-five days after accident with 
deformities of legs and feet), they could also join Canadian Company. 
Allegations that trauma was responsible for mental injury were averred in the fol-
lowing cases in which the plaintiff succeeded in removing the legal bar: Daley v. Meier, 
33 Ill. App. 2d 218, 178 N.E.2d 691 (1961) (subnormal mental faculties-mother one 
month pregnant at the time of the accident); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Ore. 690, 291 
P.2d 225 (1955) (cerebral palsy-mother three months pregnant at the time of the 
accident). See also Jasinky v. Potts, 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950). 
268. 187 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.S.C. 1960). A similar case is the matter of Shousha v. 
Matthews Drivurself Serv., 210 Tenn. 384, 358 S.W .2d 471 (1962), wherein it was alleged 
that triplets were born "bruised, mashed and crushed." In addition, in Jasinky v. Potts, 
supra note 267, it was also alleged that the infant received a direct blow. 
269. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 139 (D.D.C. 1946): "taken from its mother's 
womb through professional malpractice with resultant consequences of a detrimental 
character." See also Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 77 So. 2d 434 (1954); see text accom-
panying note 78 supra; Seattle First Nat'! Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wash. 288, 367 P.2d 835 
(1962) (negligent attempt to deliver with forceps). 
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to recover for her own injuries ~owing from a miscarriage.270 On 
the other hand, other women have and may demonstrate an excep-
tional hardiness271 in the face of physical insults. 
Dr. Hertig, in a pioneer study, thoroughly examined one thou-
sand abortuses and concluded that only one could be fairly attributed 
to external trauma.272 In addition, he discussed the incidence of 
traumatic abortion witli members of the Boston Obstetric Society, 
and the total opinion produced six accounts of bona fide traumatic 
abortion.278 Dr. Hertig summed up the proof problem in the follow-
ing manner: 
"The thesis of this report therefore may be summed up by 
stating that, in the opinion of the author, the plaintiff in a case 
of alleged traumatic abortion must present proof of the presence 
of a normal pregnancy at the time of the trauma and that the 
abortus shows objective clinical, embryological and pathologic 
evidence of the relationship to the trauma."274 
The requirement of normality of the ovum may not be accepted 
as an exculpatory factor in a court of law. In any event it is difficult 
to see how fetal normality can be of any relevance where fetal death 
is occasioned by maternal death. Nevertheless, it deserves to be 
underlined that trauma as an isolated cause in the field of prenatal 
injuries plays a relatively minor and insignificant role. It must be 
accepted that the abolition of the legal barrier is not going to change_ 
the end result in a number of cases, and the irony of the matter is 
that, although courts of law have appealed time and time again to 
the advances in medical knowledge while assailing Holmes' view, 
the advance, if any, in the trauma field has served only to emphasize 
the irrelevance of trauma as a teratogenic agent. 
Prematurity.27r; It may well be that prematurity is in itself an 
270. See note 95 supra. For a critical appraisal of the granting of relief in these cir-
cumstances, see Note, 15 U. CHI. L. REv. 188 (1947). 
271. See the exceptional case reported by OGSTON, LECTURES ON MEDICAL Jurus-
PRUDENCE 200-01 (1878), in which an abortion attempt included the ingestion of drugs, 
kneeling and jumping on the stomach of a seven months pregnant woman, and, finally, 
perforation of the uterus with a pair of scissors. All of which failed to dislodge or 
apparently affect the fetus at all. 
272. Hertig, Minimal Criteria Required To Prove Prima Facie Case of ,T;raumatic 
Abortion or Miscarriage, 117 ANN. SURGERY 596 (1943). 
273. They were (i) extreme exertion during a thunderstorm (l); (ii) auto accidents 
(3); (iii) climbing the mast of a sailboat during a sail race to fix a broken halyard (l); 
(iv) severe coughing (1). Id. at 605. 
274. Id. at 598. An additional temporal factor was added: "When trauma is an 
etiologic factor in an abortion it must immediately precede by a matter of hours, the 
onset of the sequence of events that results in an expulsion of a normal ovum." 
Id. at 604. 
275. Dr. Eastman found 73.8% of all premature births to be spontaneous. Eastman, 
Prematurity From the Viewpoint of the Obstetrician, 1 A:M. PRAc. 343 (1947). In his 
study, Anderson found no case of prematurity that could be directly and unreservedly 
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injury, and where the child survives premature labor and birth,276 
absent other injuries, "premature birth actions" may be brought.277 
The premature infant is one that weighs twenty-five hundred grams 
(five pounds, eight ounces,) or less at birth278 and is understandably 
an unfinished child. Thus its ability to cope with the external world 
is decreased. 
Some investigators have submitted that a relationship exists be-
tween prematurity and physical growth, physical defects,279 cerebral 
palsy,280 other mental handicaps, and proneness to ill health.281 The 
investigations as to these sequelae are still in the preliminary stages. 
Should a causal connection ever be satisfactorily established, an 
entirely new field of liability may be opened. It seems difficult to 
consider, however, that it will ever be possible for a child to argue 
that its present mental capacity is attributable to its premature birth 
and that absent prematurity, it would have achieved a greater aca-
demic success in life. One ought to be careful of embracing beliefs 
that can only be described as unwavering uterine predestination. On 
the other hand, the susceptibility of the prematurely born infant to 
infection or other disorders is more certain, and a wrongdoer's lia-
bility would probably be extended today to include the additional 
damage.282 
attributed to trauma. Anderson, Causes of Prematurity, 61 AM. J. DIS. CHILD. 72, 83 
(1941). 
276. The very immaturity of the child may reduce its ability to survive. But, in 
all jurisdictions, as long as it is born alive its cause of action may survive to its intestate 
estate. See note 87 supra. 
277. The premature child may in addition suffer from congenital malformations. 
Often the abnormality is itself the cause of prematurity. 
278. MONTAGU 398. 
279. Dann, The Development of Prematurely Born Children With Birth Weights or 
Minimal Post-Natal Weights of 1,000 gms. or Less, 22 PEDIATRICS 1037 (1958); Drillien, 
Physical and Mental Handicap in the Prematurely Born, 66 J. OBSTET. & GYNEC. (BRIT. 
EMP.) 721 (1959). 
280. Knobloch, The Effect of Prematurity on Health and Growth, 49 AM. J. Pun. 
HEALTH 1164 (1959); Knobloch, Neuropsychiatric Sequelae of Prematurity, 161 A.M.A.J. 
581 (1956). 
281. See James, The Later Health of Premature Infants, 22 PEDIATRICS 154 (1958); 
Lilienfeld & Pasamanick, Association of Maternal and Fetal Factors With the Develop-
ment of Mental Defidency: I. Abnormalities in the Prenatal and Paranatal Periods, 
159 A.M.A.J. 155 (1955); Lilienfeld & Pasamanick, The Assodation of Maternal and 
Fetal Factors With the Development of Mental Deficiency: II. Relationship to Maternal 
Age, Birth Order, Previous Reproductive Loss and Degree of Mental Deficiency, 60 
AM. J. MENT. DEFIC. 557 (1956). 
282. Rl:sTATEMENT, TORTS § 458 (1934); PROSSER, TORTS § 49, at 273 (2d ed. 1955). In 
Durivage v. Tufts, 94 N.H. 265, 51 A.2d 847 (1947), the plaintiff's premature child died 
after suffering from both measles and pneumonia following a cold. On cross-examina-
tion, the plaintiff husband conceded that he could not blame the defendant for the 
child's attack of measles, but opined that the defendant's fault could have led to the 
cold and the pneumonia, there being some evidence that the premature birth had 
weakened the child's resistance. No medical evidence was introduced by the plaintiffs, 
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In Mays v. Weingarten,283 it was alleged that the prematurely 
born infant, as a result thereof, contracted bronchial pneumonia at 
the age of five weeks and that, as a further result of its weakened con-
stitution, it would be congenitally susceptible to pain, suffering, 
and much inconvenience! In two other cases it was alleged that 
prematurity was related to blindness,284 and there have been a 
number of cases where the prematurity resulted in early death.285 
b. Psychic Trauma 
It will be recalled that Dr. Hertig found only seven cases of 
bona fide traumatic abortion resulting from physical trauma. With 
reference to psychic trauma, Dr. Eastman reports that: "In the 
case of psychic trauma proof is immensely more difficult to obtain. 
In questioning many men with vast obstetrical experience most say 
that they have never seen such a thing."286 
Maternal shock, unaccompanied by physical impact, may inter-
fere with respiratory processes. Fetal oxygen deficiency may be 
the result. Once more the sequelae of anoxia become relevant. But 
lesser emotional injury may also have an important influence. The 
history of the development of the law relating to emotional injury 
and the law of prenatal injuries are closely related; both present a 
potentiality for fraudulent claims,287 and both have raised nice 
questions of causation. Miscarriage, as a physical injury to the mother, 
has come to typify that class of nervous shock case in which the 
shock has been followed by the injury.288 Originally, courts 
considered the problems arising in the shock cases on the basis of 
however, and in the absence thereof the court was not prepared to indulge in the 
"sheerest speculation." Id. at 270. 
283. 82 N.E.2d 421 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943). The plaintiff failed, however, as a matter 
of law. Cf. Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit Inc., 152 Ohio St. ll4, 87 N.E.2d 334 
(1949), wherein it was alleged that as a result of its mother's fall the prematurely born 
infant plaintiff had been turned in the womb, suffered from heart trouble, anemia, 
spasms, epilepsy, was crippled, and could not walk or talk like a normal person. It 
should be noted, however, that abnormal fetal positions should not be attributed to 
external trauma. See McNeil, supra note 265, at 31. 
284. Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951); Cavanaugh v. First 
Nat'l Stores, Inc., 329 Mass. 179, 107 N.E.2d 307 (1952). 
285. E.g., Keyes v. Construction Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633; 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960); 
Bliss v. Passancsi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N.E.2d 206 (1950); Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 
ll!J S.E.2d 790 (1960). 
286. EAITMAN, WILLIAMS' OBSTETRICS 532 (12th ed. 1961). 
287. FLEMING, TORTS 169 (1959); Bohlen, Fifty Years of .Torts_, 50 HARV. L. R.Ev. 
725, 733 (1937). 
288. PROS.mt, TORTS§ 37, at 178 (2d ed. 1955). See, e.g., Rogers v. Williard, 144 Ark. 
587, 223 S.W. 15 (1920), wherein the defendant with knowledge of the plaintiff's preg-
nancy threatened to kill her husband, resulting in mental and physical pain and lead-
ing to a miscarriage. Durivagc v. Tufts, 94 N.H. 265, 51 A.2d 847 (1947). Where no 
injury follows there can be no liability against a merely negligent defendant. HAlu>EJt. 
Be JAMES, TORTS § 18.9 (1956). 
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remoteness of damage, but today the analysis has moved to a con-
sideration of the duty owed. Even this has not been helpful,289 and 
there have been further shifts from foreseeability of physical harm290 
to foreseeability of in jury by -shock. 291 Furthermore, some jurisdic-
tions still apply the corpori corpore or impact test, sometimes re-
duced to ·the most ridiculous levels.292 An increasing majority of 
courts, however, have abandoned the requirement.293 Present medical 
knowledge is in much the same confused state. Much of the litera-
ture has been based on anecdote.294 Dr. Warkany has been partic-
ularly incisive and relates an example of medical conjecture in this 
respect: it has been determined experimentally that cortisone in-
duces cleft palate in certain strains of mice;295 in criticizing the 
search for new foundations for old fables, he writes that since mater-
nal emotions "release adrenal hormones and since cortisone can 
induce cleft palate in certain strains of mice . . . new mechanisms 
[are] found for those who want to believe in ancient theory."296 
Dr. Stott is the leading advocate of a relationship between psy-
chological stress and abnormalities. He relates psychic disturbance 
to the incidence of Mongolism.297 Moreover, he opines that the 
biological persistence of reproductive casualty is a fertility-regulator 
in modern society and, therefore, explains everything in terms of 
natural population control, a view that received some applause 
from Montagu.298 · 
In this class of cases, legal technicality abounds, and confusion 
will only be increased should the prenatal injury cases ever be ex-
289. "Duty, it is agreed, depends upon foreseeability, but foreseeability, a vague 
concept at the best of times, is of quite exceptional vagueness when nervous shock is 
in issue." WINFIELD, TORTS 256 (7th ed. 1963). See generally Goodhardt, The Shock 
Cases and Area of Risk, 16 MODERN L. REv. 14 (1953). 
290. Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935); Dulieu v. White, 
[1901) K.B. 669. 
291. King v. Phillips, [1953] 1 Q.B. 429, approved by -the Privy Council as a correct 
statement of the law in Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock and Engineering 
Co. Ltd. (The Wagon Mound), [1961) All E.R. 404, 415; HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 18.4, 
at 1036 (1956). 
292. HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 18.4, at 1034 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS § 37, at 139 (2d 
ed. 1955). 
293. See; e.g., Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn, 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941); Bourhill 
v. Young, [1943] A.C. 92, 103. 
294. See Hamilton, Boyd & Mossman, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 147 (3d ed. 1962). 
295. Fraser & Fainstat, Production of Congenital Defects in the Offspring of Preg-
nant Mice Treated With Cortisone, 8 PEDIATRICS 527 (1951); Inghalls & Curley, Tiu: Re-
lation of Hydrocortisone Injections to Cleft Palate in Mice, 256 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1035 
(1957). _ 
296. Warkany, Congenital Malformations in the Past, 10 J. CHRON. DJS. 84, 90 (1959); 
cf. Fraser, Causes of Congenital Malformations in Human Beings, 10 J. CHRoN. Dis. 97, 
107 (1959). 
297. Stott, Some Psychomatic Aspects_ of Casualty in Reproduction, 3 J. PsvcHo. 
REs. 42 (1958). . 
298. MONTAGU 503-07. 
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tended to include harm suffered by the child as a result of the 
mother's emotional disturbances. Suffice it to say that for the fore-
seeable future that danger is remote. 
V. WHAT Is NEEDED 
The battle in jurisprudence is almost over. The development 
of the infant's right of action has illustrated the inherent capacity 
of legal systems to adjust to new situations. No lawyer can believe, 
however, that money does in fact remove the seal of the defendant's 
fault and that anything the law may do can alleviate the misery of 
the crippled. If the unborn plaintiff is no longer absent from the 
courts by whim of law, it ought to be remembered that the medico-
legal struggle for recognition of its right of action has been basically 
motivated by something broader than what may be regarded as an 
inevitable, just legal development. 
Law cannot provide the solution. We may retrospectively com-
pensate the tortiously damaged infant or prospectively require 
pharmaceutical concerns to take precautions against another thalid-
omide tragedy. Eugenic legislation plays a small part. The true solu-
tion is not to be found in the words of society, but in a stepped-up 
program of preventive medical research: 
"Mr. President, for 4 long years I have been urging the strength-
ening of what has come to be known as perinatal research . 
. . . On December I, 1958, I discussed this with Premier Nikita 
Krushchev in Moscow. At that time, I urged a U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
partnership in finding the answer to the mysteries of how life 
develops and how so often and so tragically it emerges with 
defects. 
"In the years which have followed, I have been a strong 
supporter of the perinatal collaborative research project . . . . 
"This project is the greatest effort of its kind ever made in 
medical history. 
"I want every U.S. agency and doctor to gain the greatest 
insight which may become available through this project."299 
That is the only answer. 
299. 108 CONG. REc. 15688 (1962) (remarks of Senator Humphrey). And see Editorial, 
1962-1 THE LANCET 303. 
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APPENDIX 
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS KNOWN To CONTRIBUTE TO CONGENITAL MALFORMATIONS 
AND FEI'AL DAMAGE 
Parental age 
Order of pregnancy 




General Biological Factors 
Blood incompatibilities (Rhesus factor) 
Regional Factors (Genital Tract and Fetal Membranes) 
Faulty implantation 
Ectopic pregnancies 
Twinning (Siamese twins, acardiac monsters) 
Amniotic bands 
Abnormal uterine position of fetus? 
Maternal Dietary Deficiencies 
Starvation (fetal rickets and ? other effects) 
Trace deficiencies (e.g., iodine in congenital cretinism) 
Maternal Infections 




Androgens; synthetic progestins; stilboestrol 




Hyperoxia (retrolental fibroplasia) 
(b) Drugs, Growth Inhibitors and Specific Antagonists 
Antimitotics (e.g., nitrogen mustard used therapeutically) 
Antimetabolites (e.g., aminopterin-used as an abortificient) 
(c) Teratogenic Dyes 
Physical Agents 
X-rays (diagnostic and therapeutic) 
Isotopes 
Atomic radiation 
(From HAMILTON, BOYD 8e MOSSMAN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 146 (3d ed. 1962)) 
